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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Americans are keenly aware of their Constitutional rights and civil 
liberties. This awareness exists primarily because of the relative clarity of the 
Constitution,1 the conciseness of the Constitution and its amendments, and 
the publicity of individuals exercising their rights.  Many of our rights are 
contained within the Bill of Rights. Recently, in Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,2 the U.S. Supreme Court opined on the interaction 
of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. This dispute occurred only because U.S. citizens were aware of 
their rights and chose to act on them.   
 
 While Americans are generally aware of their Constitutional rights, 
they are increasingly unaware of their rights arising under the tax laws. This 
is true because of the complexity of the statutory language, the substantial 
size of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), and the limited publicity of tax 
disputes. In 2015, Congress pledged to give taxpayers rights by codifying the 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights.3 While this statute did not create actionable rights, 
                                                     
 Lecturer, The University of Alabama, Culverhouse School of Accountancy and 
Adjunct Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law.  J.D., The 
University of Alabama School of Law.  Former trial attorney, Internal Revenue 
Service, Office of Chief Counsel.  Thanks go to Michelle Arnopol Cecil, William 
H. Pittman Professor of Law at The University of Missouri School of Law and 
Edward Schnee, Hugh Culverhouse Professor of Accounting at The University of 
Alabama, Culverhouse School of Accountancy, for their comments and assistance 
in connection with this article.   
1 It is well documented that there are many different interpretations of the text of 
the U.S. Constitution.  However, U.S. citizens can read the Constitution and the 
amendments thereto, and understand Congress cannot improperly limit free speech, 
the exercise of religion, the right to bear arms, and many other rights.    
2 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019-25 
(2017).   
3 Taxpayers Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 401, 129 Stat. 2242, 3117 
(2015); I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2015). The Taxpayer Bill of Rights provides the 
following rights: (1) the right to be informed, (2) the right to quality service, (3) the 
right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax, (4) the right to challenge the 
position of the Internal Revenue Service and be heard, (5) the right to appeal a 
decision of the Internal Revenue Service in an independent forum, (6) the right to 
finality, (7) the right to privacy, (8) the right to confidentiality, (9) the right to 
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it did provide a basis for assuring that taxpayers were treated fairly and 
honestly in connection with the determination and collection of taxes. 
However, Congress can only fulfill its pledge by providing taxpayers with 
actionable rights and ensuring they are aware of such rights.     
                  
On December 4, 2015, Congress passed the Fixing America’s 
Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act.4 The FAST Act was passed primarily 
to authorize federal funds for use in resurfacing, constructing, and 
rehabilitating America’s transportation infrastructure.5  Despite this purpose, 
Congress inserted several unrelated, but important, tax collection provisions 
into the bill.  Specifically, the FAST Act made substantial changes to section 
6306 of the Code,6 which controls the Department of Treasury’s use of 
qualified collection contracts.7  
 
Section 6306 was first added to the Code in 2004 with the passage 
of the American Jobs Creation Act.8 The initial framework of section 6306 
gave Treasury the explicit authority to use private collection agencies 
(“PCAs”) to collect outstanding federal tax debts.9  Prior to the creation of 
section 6306 the IRS had implied authority to contract with PCAs.10  
Consequently, the addition of section 6306 merely clarified Treasury’s 
existing authority to outsource its collection function.11 
 
  Congress’s clarification of Treasury’s implied authority limited the 
services that could be contracted to PCAs.  Treasury was only permitted to 
use qualified collection contracts to (1) locate and contact the taxpayer, (2) 
request full payment from the taxpayer, (3) attempt to obtain an installment 
agreement from the taxpayer to pay the debt within five years (if full payment 
could not be obtained), and (4) obtain the taxpayer’s financial information as 
                                                     
retain representation, and (10) the right to a fair and just tax system.  I.R.C. § 
7803(a)(3). 
4 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312. 
5 Id. 
6 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, § 32102.   
7 The term “qualified collection contract” is the defined by the Code as the type of 
contract that the Treasury Department may use to outsource its collection function 
to private debt collectors.  I.R.C. § 6306(b) (2015).     
8 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 881, 118 Stat. 1418, 
1625 (2004). 
9 Id. 
10 T.D. 9778, 2016-31 I.R.B. 197 (stating that section 6301, 6331, and 6335 had 
previously provided statutory authority for the IRS to use private agents to collect 
taxes prior to the enactment of section 6306).  
11 Id.  When section 6306 was passed, subsection (a) stated, “Nothing in any 
provision of law shall be construed to prevent the Secretary from entering into a 
qualified tax collection contract.”  Instead of granting new authority, the language 
of this subsection clarified the IRS’ existing authority to contract with PCAs and 
prevented any legal analysis which would limit such authority. 
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specified by the Secretary of the Treasury (“Secretary”).12   Treasury’s ability 
to outsource installment agreements was further constrained by the PCA’s 
lack of authority to independently verify a taxpayer’s eligibility for an 
installment agreement.13   
 
Nonetheless, the Secretary retained unfettered discretion to 
implement or terminate the private debt collection program.14 In 2006, the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) began using private collection agencies to 
collect taxpayer debts.15 However, the program proved unsuccessful and was 
ultimately terminated in 2009.16  
 
In 2015, the FAST Act amended section 6306 by requiring the IRS 
to enter into at least one qualified tax collection contract with a PCA.17 
Congress inserted the term “shall,” thereby removing Treasury’s discretion 
to implement the private debt collection program. Accordingly, Treasury and 
the IRS were tasked with the implementation of the law regardless of any 
assent or dissent from the Secretary or the IRS Commissioner. The IRS 
selected several PCAs to implement the requirements of section 6306.18 The 
                                                     
12 I.R.C. § 6306(b)(1) (2015).  The FAST Act was silent as to services which PCAs 
can perform under qualified collection contracts.  As a result, PCAs are still limited 
by this subsection as to the services which they can contractually execute on behalf 
of the IRS.     
13I.R.S. Announcement 2006-63, 2006-2 C.B. 445 2006 WL 2423308.  Taxpayers 
are not eligible for installment agreements unless they are tax compliant.  Tax 
compliance requires the filing of all required tax returns and deposit of required 
estimated tax payments.  If a taxpayer requested an installment agreement PCAs 
were required to ask the IRS to verify whether the taxpayer was tax compliant, 
since PCAs were not given unfettered access to a taxpayer’s account transcripts.      
14 When section 6306 was added to the Code there was no requirement that it be 
implemented.  Rather, this section created explicit authority allowing the 
Department of Treasury to utilize public actors to accumulate tax revenues.  Fixing 
America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 32102, 129 Stat. 
1312, 1733-36 (2015). 
15 Id.      
16 I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-19. (Mar. 5, 2009).  On March 5, 2009, the IRS 
Commissioner decided not to renew the qualified collection contracts it had with 
two PCAs.  Interestingly, the IRS felt the collection of tax debts was best 
performed by IRS employees.  The IRS cited the need for flexibility in evaluating 
cases in which taxpayers were experiencing economic hardship.  This will likely 
prove to be an issue for PCAs in 2017, since their authority to make certain 
determinations is still limited.    
17 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(1) (2015); Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, § 
32102. 
18  Private Debt Collection, I.R.S. https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/private-debt-collection [https://perma.cc/WQ9A-7ZNG] (last visited 
May 1, 2017). 
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PCAs are currently ConServe, Pioneer,19 Performant, and the CBE Group.20 
The IRS recently informed the public that these PCAs will begin collecting 
federal tax debts in Spring 2017.21   
 
In light of these developing collection efforts, it is important to 
understand collection rights that taxpayers can use as a defense against PCA 
collection actions. First, this article will provide a baseline explanation of 
changes that the FAST Act made to section 6306. The article will then 
describe the collection rights that taxpayers can deploy to protect themselves 
from PCA collection activities. The article will conclude by exploring the 
remedies available to taxpayers whose rights have been violated and propose 
Congressional amendments to these remedies to ensure Congress fulfills its 
pledge to provide taxpayers with actionable rights. 
 
II. CHANGES TO I.R.C. SECTION 6306 
 
The FAST Act made several changes to section 6306.  Subsections 
(c), (d), and (i) were added to section 6306 and subsection (e) was amended.22 
This part will examine subsections (c), (d), and (i) due to their significant 
impact on taxpayer receivables, while subsection (e) will be briefly discussed 
due to its impact on the use of revenues generated by the PCA collection 
activities. This part serves not only to clarify present taxpayer collection law, 




                                                     
19 The IRS’s use of Pioneer as a PCA is particularly troubling.  The Department of 
Education (“DOE”) recently utilized Pioneer to collect federal student loan debts.  
In 2015, the DOE executed a review of 22 private collection agencies to determine 
if they were abiding by the terms of the collection contracts.  The DOE collection 
contracts prohibited private debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive 
collection practices and required compliance with applicable federal and state laws, 
to include the FDCPA.  The DOE’s review determined that Pioneer had provided 
borrowers with inaccurate and misleading information concerning their credit 
reports and various fees.  The report further explained that Pioneer’s inaccurate 
communications occurred at an “unacceptably high rate.”  Consequently, the DOE 
did not renew Pioneer’s contract.  U.S. Department of Education to End Contracts 
with Several Private Collection Agencies, DEP’T OF EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-end-contracts-
several-private-collection-agencies [https://perma.cc/NR8D-GP9N]. 
20 Private Debt Collection, supra note 20. 
21 Id.  
22 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 32102, 129 
Stat. 1312, 1733-36 (2015).  The FAST Act also added subsections (h) and (j) to 
section 6306, however, this article will not address these additions to the Code 
because they deal primarily with contracting and Congressional reporting, 
respectively.     
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A. Collection of Inactive Tax Receivables 
 
The addition of subsection (c) changed the impact of section 6306 
and defined the scope of tax debts subject to collection. Subsection (c), 
entitled “Collection of Inactive Tax Receivables,” is composed of two 
subparagraphs.23 The first subparagraph imposes a strict requirement that the 
Secretary “shall” enter into one or more qualified tax contracts to collect “all” 
outstanding inactive tax receivables.24 Two important points of law must be 
drawn from this subparagraph.   
 
1. All Inactive Tax Receivables Must Be Collected 
 
First, the IRS must utilize PCAs.25  While the public may want to 
vilify the IRS and the media may attack the IRS as the creator of this private 
debt collection regime, it is Congress who is fully responsible for this 
program.  As usual, the IRS is the messenger of bad news and will likely be 
the recipient of angst upon delivery.   
 
Second, the IRS must collect “all” outstanding inactive tax 
receivables.26  At first glance, the term “all” does not jump off the page or 
strike concern in the hearts of taxpayers.  However, the term “all” is quite 
significant because it effectively prevents an end to this debt collection 
program.  One may first wish to define what “inactive tax receivables” are, 
which is a very important question and will be addressed shortly.  However, 
prior to such an inquiry it should be noted that tax liabilities accrue 
annually.27  As liabilities accrue, taxpayers will inevitably fail to pay their 
liabilities creating a tax receivable.  Because the statute requires collection of 
                                                     
23 I.R.C. § 6306(c) (2015). 
24 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(1) (2015). 
25 People v. O’Rourke, 13 P.2d 989, 992 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) (“In common, 
or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term ‘shall’ is a word of 
command, and one which has always, or which must be given a compulsory 
meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a peremptory meaning, and it is generally 
imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of excluding the idea of 
discretion, and has the significance of operating to impose a duty which may be 
enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning, or when 
addressed to public officials, or where a public interest is involved, or where the 
public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a 
contrary intent appears . . .”). 
26 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(1) (2015). 
27 I.R.C. § 6072(a) (2015).  Individual returns required under section 6012, 6013, or 
6017 must be filed by the 15th day of the fourth month following the end of the 
taxable year.  Generally, individual taxpayers file their returns on a calendar basis 
causing the due date to fall on April 15th.  Tax returns filed voluntarily are self-
assessments.  If taxpayers are deficient in paying the full amount of their 
assessment a tax receivable will immediately accrue.  
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all inactive tax receivables and Congress appears commissioned to regularly 
penalize the IRS by imposing budgetary sanctions,28 leaving no staff to 
collect receivables, it is extremely likely that there will always be inactive 
tax receivables on the IRS balance sheet.  Therefore, without an act of 
Congress repealing or amending subsection (c)(1), the use of PCAs will be 
required and will continue indefinitely.  
 
2. Inactive Tax Receivables 
The second paragraph of subsection (c) defines “inactive tax 
receivable,”29 establishing the scope of the debt that the IRS must outsource 
to the PCAs.30  An inactive tax receivable is defined as a tax receivable that 
(1) has been assessed and subsequently removed from active inventory due 
to a lack of resources or an inability to locate the taxpayer,31 (2) more than 
one-third of the applicable statute of limitations32 has lapsed and such 
receivable has not been assigned for collection,33 or (3) has been assigned for 
collection and more than 365 days have passed without interaction with the 
taxpayer or a third party for purposes of collecting the receivable.34  Any one 
of these three scenarios will cause a tax receivable to become inactive and 
subject to referral to a PCA. 
 
 
                                                     
28 The IRS budget has been reduced almost every year since 2010.  In 2010, 
Congress appropriated approximately $14 billion to fund IRS operations.  By 2013, 
the IRS budget had been decreased to $12 billion.  In 2017, the continuing 
resolution provided the IRS with $11.5 billon, and Trump’s budget for 2018 
proposes to decrease agency funding to $11 billion.  Brandon Debot, Emily Horton, 
and Chuck Marr, Trump Budget Continues Multi-Year Assault on IRS Funding 
Despite Mnuchin’s Call for More Resources (March 16, 2017), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/trump-budget-continues-multi-year-
assault-on-irs-funding-despite-mnuchins [https://perma.cc/N8U6-D3UT] (the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities study was based on data from the 
Congressional Budget Office, Office of Management and Budget, and the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics).   
29 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(A) (2015).   
30 It should be noted that I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(B) defines “tax receivable” as any 
outstanding assessment which the IRS includes in potentially collectible inventory.  
As a result, the tax debts at issue have been (1) self-assessed by taxpayers by 
voluntarily filing returns, (2) summarily assessed pursuant to a specific statutory 
grant, or (3) assessed after deficiency procedures have been exhausted (i.e., 
taxpayers have defaulted on a notice of deficiency, resolved the matter 
administratively, or received a judicial determination).    
31 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(A)(i) (2015). 
32 I.R.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2012) (generally, a collection of an assessment of tax by 
levy or a proceeding in court can be properly made within 10 years after the 
assessment of tax). 
33 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2015). 
34 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2015). 
2017 Taxpayer Collection Rights as a Defense to Private Debt Collection 93 
3. Tiers of Delinquency 
The three bases outlined above for classifying a tax receivable as 
inactive can be grouped into three different tiers of delinquency.  The first 
tier is for tax receivables that have been assessed, but the assessment is 
removed from active inventory because the IRS does not have the resources 
to work the collection of the receivable or cannot locate the taxpayer.  This 
tier can occur fairly quickly within a debt’s lifecycle.    
 
Once a tax debt is assessed, the IRS will send a series of demands 
for payment over a six-month timeframe.35  This six-month timeframe is 
referred to as “notice status.”36  If the taxpayer cannot be reached or the debt 
is not resolved during notice status, the debt becomes delinquent and enters 
Taxpayer Delinquent Account (“TDA”) status.37  Debts in TDA status will 
be collected by the Automated Collection System,38 assigned to a revenue 
officer, await assignment to a revenue officer, or be shelved.39  Shelved cases 
are not actively worked.40  The shelved cases and other cases classified as 
Currently Not Collectible (“CNC”) are likely the cases referred to in section 
6306(c)(2)(A)(i) as assessments which have been removed from active 
inventory.  However, some of these cases have been excluded from 
contracting.  The IRS has informed the Taxpayer Advocate that cases 
classified as CNC because of hardship status41 will not be considered a tax 
                                                     
35 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS TAS RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 
IRS COLLECTABILITY CURVE, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE,  
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Vol
ume2_2-CollectibilityCurve.pdf. (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).  
36 Id.   
37 Id.   
38 IRM § 5.19.5.2. The Automated Collection System (“ACS”) is a computerized 
collection system which contains a database of balance due accounts and return 
delinquency investigations.  ACS utilizes mail and telephone contact with 
taxpayers to solicit payments, obtain information about assets subject to levy, file 
liens, and serve levies.  Telephone contact is made using a predictive dialer system.  
The predictive dialer system conducts staffed and unstaffed campaigns.  When 
ACS deploys a staffed campaign the automated call will connect the taxpayer with 
an IRS employee.  If ACS executes an unstaffed campaign the taxpayer will be 
directed to call the IRS back. IRM § 5.19.5.3.9.2.  
39 Taxpayer Advocate Service, supra note 37.  Shelved cases generally describe 
Currently Not Collectible accounts which are too small in amount to validate use of 
resources for collection. 
40 Id. 
41 IRM § 1.2.14.1.14. Hardship status will arise when a taxpayer has some assets or 
income that the IRS could levy upon, but such a levy would prevent the taxpayer 
from meeting her necessary living expenses.  Hardships should be distinguished 
from inconveniences, as the latter would not prevent assignment to a PCA.  IRM § 
1.2.14.1.14.   
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receivable42 and therefore will not be contracted out to PCAs.43  The 
remaining CNC cases and other inactive inventory will be ripe for contracting 
and must be sent to PCAs for collection action.  Debts within this first tier of 
delinquency could become inactive tax receivables within six months of 
assessment.  
 
The second tier of delinquency is for debts that have been assigned 
for collection but collection representatives or revenue officers have not 
successfully interacted with the taxpayer or a third party in connection with 
the taxpayer, over the course of one year.44  These cases would have 
previously been through the six-month notice status.  Tax receivables in this 
tier could become inactive within eighteen months of assessment. 
 
The third tier of delinquency is for debts that have been outstanding 
for more than one-third of the applicable statute of limitations period and 
have yet to be assigned to an IRS collection representative or revenue officer.  
The applicable statute of limitations will be the collection statute of 
limitations, which is generally ten years.45  One-third of this statute of 
limitations is forty months (three and one-third years).  These debts would 
not have been removed from inactive inventory (otherwise they would be 
deemed inactive by means of tier one) but rather would have been awaiting 
assignment to an IRS employee for collection.  As a result, these debts would 
have been through notice status and then would have been awaiting 
assignment.  However, because the statute refers to the collection statute 
period as the determining factor, the six-month period would be added to the 
period awaiting assignment.  Therefore, the debt would need to be sitting in 
TDA status for only thirty-four months to become inactive.  Debts in the third 
tier could become inactive within forty months of assessment. 
 
B. Tax Receivables Excluded from Qualified Collection Contracts  
   
 The FAST Act added section 6306(d) to the Code to limit the types 
of tax receivables that could be contracted to PCAs.  Tax receivables are 
defined as any outstanding assessments that the IRS deems potentially 
                                                     
42 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(B) (2015).  
43 The IRS Plan for Implementing the Private Debt Collection Program Includes 
Practices That Will Harm Taxpayers and Tax Administration, TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE SERVICE, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-
JRC/Area_of_Focus_2.pdf. (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).  
44 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2015). 
45 I.R.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2012) (there are several exceptions to the general ten-year 
statute of limitations, including the suspension of the statute during the period in 
which a taxpayer’s case is pending before a tribunal for adjudication of the 
collection of the tax or determination of the liability). 
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collectible.46  The all-inclusive nature of this definition creates the potential 
for most outstanding assessments in TDA status to become inactive and 
subject to referral to the PCAs regardless of their administrative 
classification.  To prevent such an impact, Congress added subsection (d). 
 
 Subsection (d) excludes tax receivables from qualified collection 
contracts that are (1) subject to a pending offer-in-compromise47 or 
installment agreement,48 (2) classified as an innocent spouse case,49 (3) 
characterized as receivables related to a (a) decedent, (b) person under the 
age of 18, (c) taxpayer in a designated combat zone, or (d) victim of tax-
related identity theft, (4) currently under examination, litigation, criminal 
investigation, or levy, or (5) subject to a right of appeal under the Code.50  
The subsection (d) exclusions can be grouped into two categories: active tax 
receivables and special circumstances. 
 
1. Active Receivables 
 
The receivables described in subsections (d)(1), (2), (4), and (5) 
should be classified as active receivables.  Pending offers-in-compromise and 
installment agreements, innocent spouse cases, cases currently under 
examination, litigation, criminal investigation or levy, and receivables 
currently on appeal are all being actively worked by IRS employees.51  While 
these active receivables could technically fall into inactive status for purposes 
of section 6306(c),52 in reality the Service is actively engaged in determining 
                                                     
46 I.R.C. § 6306(c)(2)(B) (2015). 
47 I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2014).  Section 7122 provides a basis for the IRS to 
compromise a liability.  However, an offer-in compromise cannot be pending for 
the purposes of this exclusion unless the taxpayer has submitted a written offer, 
presumably on Form 656.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(d) (2002); Huntress v. 
Commissioner, T.C.M. 2009-161 (CCH) (an offer must be submitted to be 
considered); O’Neil v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2009-183 (taxpayer and Appeals 
officer had conversations about an offer-in-compromise, but the taxpayer’s failure 
to submit a written offer prevented the Appeals officer from considering the offer).  
48 I.R.C. § 6159. (2012). 
49 I.R.C. § 6015 (2012). 
50 I.R.C. § 6306(d) (2015). 
51 See, e.g., IRM § 5.8.8.1 (Oct. 20, 2016) (IRS employees must analyze the facts, 
circumstances and financial situation when considering an offer-in-compromise); 
IRM § 9.5.1.2.1 (July 2, 2014) (criminal investigations require the accumulation of 
facts and evidence to determine if the person has committed a criminal violation).     
52 For example, innocent spouse cases are not classified as collection cases in the 
I.R.S. IRM, but rather as “special topics” in part twenty-five. IRM § 25 (Sept. 5, 
2017). As a result, it is possible for such a tax debt to have been self-assessed on a 
married filing jointly return more than forty months prior to the filing of a request 
for innocent spouse relief and for such debt to have never been assigned to a 
collection employee.  Such a scenario would cause a debt to be deemed an inactive 
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the existence of a taxpayer’s liability, the amount of the liability, and/or the 
payment of the liability.  Administratively, the IRS would have no interest in 
farming out these receivables because it is currently involved in the 
resolution of the liability.  Further, the functions that the IRS could perform 
on these active receivables greatly outnumber the statutorily authorized 
duties that PCAs could execute on behalf of the IRS.53  Thus, section 6306(d) 
properly excludes these active receivables from qualified collection contracts 
to achieve collection efficiencies. 
                 
2. Special Circumstances 
 
The situations described in subsection (d)(3) should be classified as 
special circumstances.  This subsection excludes taxpayer receivables that 
involve a taxpayer who is (a) deceased, (b) under the age of 18, (c) in a 
designated combat zone, or (d) a victim of tax-related identity theft.54  Each 
of these circumstances presents a special set of issues that could require 
further investigation by the IRS.  Accordingly, these receivables are excluded 
from qualified collection contracts in part due to the special training that IRS 
employees have to determine the amount or collectability of the tax 
receivable.55  Several examples of the complexities will illuminate the need 
for these receivables to be excluded from qualified collection contracts.   
 
Collecting taxes from a decedent are particularly cumbersome.  The 
IRS often has to determine whether the liability is joint and several, and then 
must inquire as to whether there is a surviving spouse.56  If the liability was 
not joint and several or there was no surviving spouse, then the IRS will need 
to consider filing a proof of claim in a probate proceeding.57  The IRS 
collection employee would need to engage in research to determine whether 
the probate estate is open, whether the estate contains assets, and the cost of 
collecting assets from the estate.58  IRS employees are highly qualified to 
perform the decedent estate analysis due to their training and experience in 
                                                     
receivable pursuant to section 6306(c)(2)(A)(ii) despite being actively worked by 
an IRS employee.    
53 I.R.C. § 6306(b) (2015). 
54 I.R.C. § 6306(d)(3) (2015). 
55 2016 Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/2016-annual-report-to-congress/most-
serious-problems [https://perma.cc/NP3K-S44V] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). The 
National Taxpayer Advocate cited a lack of training PCA employees as a serious 
concern to taxpayer rights. Id. In light of this lack of training, it is no surprise that 
the types of occurrences listed in section 6306(d)(3) are being excluded from 
qualified collection contracts due to the complexities associated with collecting 
these tax receivables. 
56 IRM § 5.5.3.2. 
57 Id. 
58 IRM § 5.5.3.5.1. 
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such matters which could not be said of PCA employees executing a similar 
inquiry. Further, IRS employees would also have access to account 
transcripts, wage and income transcripts, and other taxpayer data that would 
quickly assist in making a cost-benefit determination of pursuing probate 
assets PCAs will not have access to similar taxpayer data.   
 
Tax receivables connected to a taxpayer claim of identity theft 
require even more investigation and analysis than a receivable involving a 
decedent.  When a taxpayer’s identity is stolen, often a fraudulent 1099 or 
W-2 will be issued using the taxpayer’s social security number, creating 
unreported income.59  This will lead to the issuance of notice of deficiency60 
and ultimately an assessment.61  Once the IRS attempts to collect this 
deficiency, taxpayers may claim that they never earned such income.  
Taxpayers who claim that their identity was stolen will be required to 
authenticate their identity and submit Form 14039 “Identity Theft 
Affidavit.”62  Investigation will then be required to determine whether the 
taxpayer is entitled to relief.  Ultimately, the IRS may decide to completely 
abate the assessment associated with identity theft, thereby eliminating the 
tax receivable.63 
 
These two examples solidify Congress’s decision to exclude this 
category of receivables from qualified collection contracts.  Special training 
and experience will be necessary to properly determine the amount of such 
receivables and whether collection efforts should be pursued.    
 
C. Use of Qualified Collection Contract Proceeds 
 
The FAST Act also amended subsection (e), which controls how 
Treasury uses the funds collected through qualified collection contracts.   
Originally, subsection (e)(2) stated that no more than twenty-five percent of 
proceeds collected under qualified collection contracts could be used to fund 
collection enforcement activities.64  In 2015, subsection (e)(2) was amended 
                                                     
59 IRM § 8.6.5.1.1. 
60 I.R.C. § 6212(a)-(b) (2012) (if the IRS determines a tax return was deficient in its 
payment of taxes, a notice of deficiency will be sent to the taxpayer’s last known 
address). 
61 I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2017) (if the taxpayer fails to petition the Tax Court within 
applicable ninety-day or 150-day period, the IRS will legally assess the deficiency 
related to the unreported income created by the fraudulent 1099 or W-2).  
62 IRM § 8.6.5.2.  When the IRS requests authentication of identity and Form 
14039, taxpayers have thirty days to provide such substantiation.  If the taxpayer 
provides the information after the thirty-day period, the IRS will presume there was 
no identity theft.  Time is of the essence when supporting a claim for identity theft.  
63 IRM § 8.6.5.8. 
64 I.R.C. § 6306(e)(2) (2015); Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 114-94, § 32103, 129 Stat. 1312, 1736 (2015). 
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by changing the use of funds from “collection enforcement activities” to the 
“special compliance personnel program account under section 6307.”65   
 
The amendment to section 6306(e)(2) cannot be fully comprehended 
without analyzing section 6307.  The FAST Act added section 6307,66 
entitled “Special Compliance Personnel Program Account.”67  Congress 
added section 6307 to require the IRS to establish an account to fund the 
hiring, training, and employment of special compliance personnel.68  Special 
compliance personnel are defined as IRS field function collection officers 
(i.e., revenue officers) or automated collection system employees.69  While 
section 6306(e)(2) limits the amount of qualified collection contract proceeds 
that can be used to fund the special compliance personnel program account 
to twenty-five percent, section 6307(a) requires Treasury to transfer some 
funds to this account.70  As a result, Treasury must use some of the qualified 
collection contract proceeds to hire and train collection employees, but it 
cannot use more than a quarter of the collection proceeds to achieve this 
purpose.71   
 
In sum, this amendment appears to have minimal impact on the IRS 
collection budget.  While Treasury must disburse some collection proceeds 
to enforce IRS collections, they are not required to allocate hardly any funds.  
The statutory language which grants the IRS a portion of the private 
collection proceeds is cloaked in administrative discretion, thereby removing 
the majority of the monetary benefit contained in the flush language.       
     
D. Collection Relief for Taxpayers in a Federal Disaster Area 
 
 Congress added subjection (i) to give the IRS discretion to provide 
private debt collection relief to taxpayers who have experienced a federal 
disaster.72  Subsection (i) provides Treasury with the authority to prescribe 
procedures whereby a taxpayer who is determined to have been affected by 
                                                     
65 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, § 32103. 
66 Id. 
67 I.R.C. § 6307 (2015). 
68 I.R.C. § 6307(a)-(b) (2015) (the Secretary is prohibited from using the funds for 
any purpose other than for expenses associated with developing collection 
employees’ skills and reimbursing governmental agencies that are incurring costs 
in connection with the administration of qualified collection contracts). 
69 I.R.C. § 6307(d)(1) (2015). 
70 I.R.C. § 6307(a) (2015) (the statute is unclear as to exactly when the proceeds 
from private collections must be transferred into this program account, and instead 
provides the Secretary with significant discretion as to when the funds must be 
transferred into the account – “time to time”). 
71 Id.; I.R.C. § 6306(e)(2) (2015).   
72 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, § 32103. 
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a federally declared disaster73 may request (1) relief from PCA collection 
action, and (2) a return of the inactive tax receivable to the IRS for collection 
by an IRS employee.74   
 
 The addition of subsection (i) provides limited relief, if any, to 
taxpayers in a federal disaster area.  First, the IRS will need to issue revenue 
procedures to grant taxpayers relief.75  This section did not create taxpayer 
relief, rather it granted the IRS authority to create relief by publishing 
procedures through which taxpayers could request relief.  Section 6306(i) is 
a permissive, not compulsory, statute.  Consequently, without an IRS revenue 
procedure, taxpayers in a federal disaster area with inactive tax receivables 
will not have an independent basis for relief from private debt collection.      
                  
 Second, even if the IRS publishes guidance for federal disaster area 
collection relief, these taxpayer receivables will still be sent to PCAs if 
categorized as inactive.  Disaster area inactive tax receivables are not 
excluded from qualified collection contracts.  The construction of this statute 
places the burden on the taxpayer to request relief.  Administratively, it may 
be difficult for the IRS to systematically identify taxpayers who are located 
in a federal disaster area and tie the year of the receivable to the year of such 
disaster.  However, this difficulty exists only because Congress and the IRS 
have failed to invest in information technology that would allow the agency 
to perform such a query.76  This lack of resources and foresight curtails 
taxpayer rights.   
 
 Section 6306 has been drastically changed by the addition of 
subsections (c), (d), and (i) and the amendment to subsection (e).  Congress 
removed Treasury’s discretion to implement the private debt collection 
program and now requires the IRS to outsource its collection function.  
Section 6306 specifically defines the debts which must be contracted to 
PCAs.  Certain active receivables and special receivables have been 
                                                     
73 I.R.C. § 165(i)(5) (2017).  A federally declared disaster area is any disaster that 
is determined by the President of the United States to warrant federal assistance.  
Section 165 generally deals with personal losses.  Personal losses incurred as a 
result of a federally declared disaster are a type of casualty loss.  Revenue 
procedure 2016-53 provides guidance on how to elect the year for deducting such a 
casualty loss.  Rev. Proc. 2016-53, 2016-44 I.R.B. 530.  It will be interesting to see 
how this particular revenue procedure may impact a taxpayer’s ability to request 
relief under section 6306(i).        
74 I.R.C. § 6306(i) (2015). 
75 Id. 
76 Jen Wieczner, The IRS and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Decade, 
FORTUNE, April 1, 2016, available at, http://fortune.com/2016/03/25/irs-
technology-taxes (discussing the recent illegal hacks of taxpayer data and citing 
that the IRS “still uses half-century-old magnetic tapes to store and process tax 
return records, as well as versions of Windows so old that Microsoft abandoned 
upkeep for them years ago.”).  
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specifically excluded from qualified collection contracts to ensure collection 
efficiencies.  Congress set aside a portion of the funds received from qualified 
collection contract efforts to assist the IRS with its internal collection efforts, 
but it is unlikely these funds will significantly increase the IRS collection 
budget.  Potential protections for taxpayers in federal disaster areas were built 
into the statute, but administrative action will be necessary to implement such 
relief.  Overall, the effect of the changes to section 6306 are to force the IRS 
to outsource inactive tax receivables to PCAs, regardless of the possible 
impact on taxpayer rights.    
   
III. TAXPAYER COLLECTION RIGHTS 
 
 In Spring 2017, PCAs began calling taxpayers and requesting 
payment of inactive tax receivables.77  Many taxpayers will be unaware that 
the IRS has been authorized to contract with PCAs78 and they will be even 
more uninformed regarding what rights they can assert against PCA 
collection efforts.  This part will discuss taxpayers’ collection rights and how 
they can assert such rights.  It will begin by providing a general discussion 
of Fair Tax Collection Practices (“FTCP”)79 and the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”),80 and how these two bodies of law are 
incorporated into Code section 6306.  This part will then catalog specific 
taxpayer collection rights granted by the FTCP and FDCPA and suggest 
strategic methods for asserting such rights.  The analysis of taxpayer rights 
will include a review of case law and administrative data to illuminate what 
factual scenarios could give rise to violations of taxpayer rights.  
 
A.  Taxpayer Collection Rights Incorporated Into Section 6306  
In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA in response to the abundant 
evidence of abusive and unjust debt collection practices by private debt 
collectors.81  The FDCPA created significant rights for consumers as a 
protection against aggressive private debt collectors.82   
                                                     
77 Private Debt Collection, (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/private-debt-collection. 
78 Roger Yu, That Call from an Unlisted Number? Might be a Collections Rep for 
IRS, USA TODAY, (Jan. 26, 2017), (discussing how consumer advocates are 
worried about the use of PCAs to collect tax receivables and noting that criminal 
scams will surely be associated with the rollout of the private debt collection 
program) http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/01/26/call-unlisted-number-
might-collections-rep-irs/97008668/. 
79 I.R.C. § 6304(a)-(b) (2012). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012). 
81  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977). 
82 Id. 
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In 1998, Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act (“RRA”).83  The passage of the RRA was in 
response to Congressional concerns that the IRS was trampling on the rights 
of American citizens.84  The RRA overhauled the organization of the IRS and 
added a large number of taxpayer protections.85  One type of protection came 
in the form of collection rights.  Section 3466(a) of the RRA added section 
6304 to the Code, entitled Fair Tax Collection Practices.86  The private sector 
was already subject to the provisions of the FDCPA, but no similar laws 
existed to restrict the public sector, such as the IRS, from engaging in abusive 
and harmful collection tactics.87  The FTCP codified certain portions of the 
FDCPA to protect taxpayers from government tax collectors.88     
 
In 2004, Congress added section 6306 with the passage of the 
American Jobs Creation Act.89  As discussed, section 6306 provided explicit 
authority for the IRS to outsource its collection function.90  Congress 
tempered this explicit authority by providing taxpayers with certain 
collection rights.  Section 6306(b)(2) prohibited contractors from committing 
                                                     
83  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.No. 
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). 
84 Senator Baucus discussed a letter he received from one of his constituents.  In the 
letter, the taxpayer described how the IRS employee had tracked down the 
taxpayers and left a nasty note on the front door of the taxpayer’s house.  When the 
taxpayer called the IRS, the employee was very rude and spoke to the taxpayer in a 
degrading manner.  Further, the IRS employee said he expected to be paid in full 
and treated the taxpayer as if she and her husband were criminals.  Ultimately the 
agent put a lien on the taxpayer’s home.  Senator Baucus summarized the note by 
saying, “I think this letter sums up the issue in a nutshell; that is, to make the 
Government work much more for people, not against them, that is, put service back 
into the Internal Revenue Service instead of being arrogant and degrading people as 
much as the Service has in the past.”  114 CONG. REC. S7643-02 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 
1998) (Statement of Sen. Baucus).  
85 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act enacted a large number 
of taxpayer protections.  Specifically, Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics were 
authorized by the addition of I.R.C. § 7526 and collection due process rights were 
given to taxpayers subject to lien filings and levies by means of §§ 6320 and 6330, 
respectively. I.R.C §§ 7526, ;6320, ;6330 (2012). 
86 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, at 768 (no changes 
have been made to section 6304 since its addition in 1998). 
87 S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 93 (1998).  The FDCPA already had laws impacting the 
times private debt collectors could call debtors (local time between 8 a.m. and 9 
p.m.) and preventing these companies from harassing or abusing debtors, among 
others.  Congress determined the IRS should at least be as polite and professional 
as private debt collectors.  
88 144 CONG. REC. E411-02 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1998) (Representative William 
Coyne of Pennsylvania included in his summary of the bill that it required “the IRS 
to comply with Fair Debt Collection Practices Act rules . . .”).   
89 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, § 881. 
90 I.R.C. § 6306(a) (2015). 
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acts or omissions which IRS employees were prohibited from committing 
during the performance of collection activities.91  This language effectively 
incorporated preexisting FTCP rights contained in section 6304.  Section 
6306(g) 92 also provided taxpayers with the rights contained in the FDCPA 
to the extent not superseded by section 6304 or section 7602(c).93  
Consequently, it is important to identify which section 6306 taxpayer rights 
are controlled by the FTCP and which taxpayer rights are controlled by the 
FDCPA. 
 
The FTCP controls communications with taxpayers94 and third 
parties95 with respect to collection of a tax.96  The FTCP also prohibits 
harassment and abuse of taxpayers in connection with the collection of 
unpaid taxes.97  All additional rights described in the FDCPA are available 
for defense against PCAs.   
                                                     
91 I.R.C. § 6306(b)(2) (2015).   
92 I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015).  When section 6306 was initially added to the code in 
2004 the FDCPA rights were codified as section 6306(e).  American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, § 881.  Due to the significant changes made to section 6306 by the 
FAST Act, the FDCPA rights were redesignated as section 6306(g).  Fixing 
America’s Surface Transportation Act, § 32102. 
93I.R.C § 7602 (2017) (describing I.R.C § authorized and prohibited conduct for 
IRS employees when they are determining or collecting a tax liability); 
I.R.C.7602(c) (2017) (specifically limiting certain IRS employee conduct in 
connection with collection actions); I.R.S. § 6306(g) (ensuring taxpayers received 
collection rights on par with IRS collection actions, Congress incorporated section 
7602(c) and section 6304 into the qualified collection contract statute).  For 
simplicity, throughout the text for the remainder of this article, when the term 
“FTCP” is used, it will include not only rights under section 6304, but also rights 
under section 7602(c).   
94 I.R.C. § 6304(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) (2012) (A review of Code section 
6304(a) and section 1692c(a) of the FDCPA will reveal a nearly symmetrical 
framework of limitations regarding communications with a debtor.  I.R.C. § 
6304(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) (2012).  As a result, there can be no doubt 
that Code section 6304(a) supersedes section 1692c of the FDCPA.  As will be 
discuss infra, while the frameworks of these two sections are substantially the 
same, certain language utilized in section 6304(a) will expand taxpayer rights. 
95 Code section 7602(c) controls IRS communications with third parties with 
respect to the collection of a tax.  I.R.C. § 7602(c) (2017).  Code section 7602(c) 
speaks to the same collection concerns as section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, use of 
third parties to collect tax.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2012).  As a result, section 
7602(c) supersedes 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. 
96 I.R.C. §§ 6304(a) (2012), 7602(c) (2017). 
97 I.R.C. § 6304(b) (2012).  A comparison of code section 6304(b) and section 
1692d of the FDCPA will disclose nearly identical language.  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 
1692d (2017).  The only significant difference between the two statutes concerns a 
private prohibition against publication or advertisement of consumer debts.  15 
U.S.C. §1692d(3)-(4) (2017). Clearly Congress was not concerned with the IRS’s 
ability to harass taxpayers by publishing the names of delinquent taxpayers, in light 
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This general overview of how the FTCP and FDCPA were 
incorporated into section 6306 is very instructive as to what statutes provide 
taxpayer rights.  However, further analysis of the FTCP and FDCPA is 
necessary to determine what specific rights taxpayers may assert against 
PCAs.     
 
B.  Taxpayer Rights Established By Fair Tax Collection Practices and 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
 
As PCAs begin contacting taxpayers to collect inactive tax 
receivables, taxpayers should be fully aware of the rights that they may assert 
during collection activities.  This portion of the article will discuss collection 
rights established by the FTCP and FDCPA.  Specifically, the article will 
address rights associated with (1) communications with taxpayers, (2) 
communications with third-parties, (3) ceasing communication, (4) 
harassment and abuse, and (5) validation of debts.  These rights will be 
examined by reviewing the statutory law and then analyzing the applicable 
case law, if any, to illuminate factual issues.  
   
1. Communications with Taxpayers  
 
As discuss supra, communications with taxpayers are controlled by 
the FTCP. Section 6304(a) of the FTCP prevents PCA employees from 
communicating with taxpayers to collect a tax debt (1) at an unusual time or 
place or a place inconvenient to the taxpayer (whether such inconvenience 
was known or should have been known), (2) if the PCA knows the taxpayer 
is represented by an attorney or power of attorney98 (i.e., authorized 
representative) and has knowledge or access to the representative’s contact 
information, unless the representative is nonresponsive or the taxpayer 
consents to direct communication, or (3) at the taxpayer’s place of 
employment if the PCA is on notice the taxpayer’s employer prohibits such 
communication.99  Additionally, PCAs are generally limited to contacting the 
taxpayer within the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 p.m., local time.100   
 
                                                     
of Code section 6103’s limitations on public disclosure of taxpayer information.  
See generally I.R.C. § 6103 (2016).  To ensure that PCAs were required to abide by 
similar disclosure laws, Congress added a subparagraph (k)(12) to Code section 
6103.  Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 
32102(d), 129 Stat. 1312, 1734-35 (2015).   Therefore, while the FTCP does not 
appear to be as comprehensive as the FDCPA, in actuality the two statutes provide 
the same collection rights. 
98 IRM 4.11.55.1.2.1 (taxpayers who wish to have a practitioner represent them 
before the IRS will generally be required to file a Form 2848 with the IRS).  
99 I.R.C. §§ 6304(a)(1)-(3) (2012); I.R.C. § 6306(b)(2) (2015). 
100 I.R.C. § 6304 (2012) (hanging paragraph). 
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The controlling statutory law of the FTCP closely mirrors the 
FDCPA.  In fact, the language of the FTCP includes the rights existing under 
the FDCPA and further expands those rights.  Due to a lack of FTCP 
litigation, a review of the FDCPA case law is illustrative of the factual 
circumstances that could give rise to taxpayer communication violations. 
   
a. Time or Place Known to be Inconvenient 
 
PCAs cannot contact taxpayers at an unusual time or place or a time 
or place known to be inconvenient.101  Debt collectors have been held 
responsible for contacting consumers at times or places they knew were 
inconvenient to the consumer.  In Austin v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 
Inc., the debt collector called the consumer at work several times to collect a 
debt.102  The consumer responded to the debt collector, informing it that she 
was very upset that calls were being made to her while she was at work.103  
The debt collector placed four additional calls to the consumer at work after 
receiving notice that such calls were inconvenient.104  The court held the debt 
collector violated section 1692c(a)(1) of the FDCPA when it communicated 
with the consumer after receiving notice the phone calls were 
inconvenient.105 
 
In Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc., the debt collector 
called the consumer numerous times at work in an attempt to collect a debt.106  
The consumer informed the debt collector that the debt had been previously 
paid, but the collection calls persisted.107  The consumer repeatedly told the 
debt collector that he was not allowed to receive personal calls at work, and 
requested that no more calls be made to his work number.108  The debt 
collector did not honor the request, and, in one instance, made five calls to 
                                                     
101 I.R.C. §§ 6304(a)(1) (2012); I.R.C. § 6306(b)(2) (2015). 




105 Id. at 559.  But see Sanchez v. Client Services, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1160 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that when a debt collector made fifty-four telephone calls 
and left twenty-five messages at the consumer’s workplace in an attempt to collect 
the debt, the debt collector’s actions were not considered to be made at an 
inconvenient time or place because consumer did not inform the debt collector it 
was inconvenient). 
106 Chiverton v. Fed. Fin. Grp., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D. Conn. 2005) 
(finding that because the plaintiff in this case was employed by the U.S. 
Department of Defense as a fiscal supervisor, it was particularly important that the 
debt collector not contact the plaintiff at work).   
107 Id. (noting that the consumer sent the debt collector proof that the debt had been 
paid in full, but collector responded by calling the consumer a liar and threatened  
to report the debt to the credit agencies).  
108 Id. 
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the consumer’s work number in a span of several minutes.109  The court held 
the debt collector liable for making calls at a place known to be 
inconvenient.110  
 
 Taxpayers do not have to receive phone calls at work from PCAs if 
it is distracting or upsetting, even if the employer permits such calls.  
Taxpayers can defend themselves from PCA collection actions by informing 
PCAs that it is inconvenient for them to be contacted at work.    To properly 
assert this defense, taxpayers must explicitly request that PCAs not contact 
them at work.  Further, taxpayers should send the PCA a certified letter 
documenting the inconvenience to create and preserve evidence of PCA 
knowledge.   
 
b. Taxpayer Represented by Person Authorized to Practice  
Before IRS 
 
PCAs cannot contact taxpayers if they have knowledge that the 
taxpayers are represented by a person authorized to practice before the 
IRS.111  PCAs will be very familiar with the majority of the FTCP 
requirements in Code section 6304(a) because they generally mirror the 
FDCPA, but section 6304(a)(2) adds a wrinkle not applicable to their general 
operations.  The FDCPA prevents private debt collectors from 
communicating with persons represented by an attorney, but it does not 
discuss persons represented by a person authorized to practice before the 
IRS.112  Because attorneys who file a written statement with the IRS are 
persons authorized to practice before the IRS, and various other tax 
professionals may register with the IRS and become authorized, this portion 
of the FTCP expands taxpayer rights.113  IRS transmission of taxpayer 
materials to PCAs will require detail regarding whether a taxpayer is 
represented by an authorized representative.  PCA employees will need to be 
aware that taxpayer representation by CPAs and other non-attorney tax 
professionals prevents direct communication with taxpayers.  Taxpayers and 
                                                     
109 Id. at 100. (finding that even after this series of phone calls, the debt collector 
called the consumer’s place of employment again and spoke with the consumer’s 
supervisor about the alleged debt). 
110 Id.   
111 I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015); I.R.C. § 6304(a)(2) (2012). 
112 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2012). 
113 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2014). Treasury Department Circular 230 provides a detailed 
list of persons who may practice before the IRS.  This list includes attorneys, 
certified public accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement 
plan agents, registered tax return preparers, individuals representing themselves, 
and representatives of partnerships and corporations. Id. 
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their representatives should be attentive to whether PCAs comply with this 
provision.114 
 
Debt collectors have illegally contacted represented consumers on a 
number of occasions.  In Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch, & Chargo, P.A., the debt 
collector attempted to collect a disputed debt from a consumer.115  Despite 
the consumer’s communication to the credit card company that the charges 
to the card were fraudulent, and after she filed a police report to that effect, 
the creditor sent the debt to a debt collector.116  In response to the collection 
action, the consumer sent the debt collector a letter, which stated that she 
disputed the debt, requested no further communications, and informed it that 
she was represented by an attorney.117  After the consumer mailed the letter, 
the debt collector contacted the consumer two times on the phone, during 
which the consumer informed the collector that she was represented by an 
attorney.118  Approximately two weeks after these contacts, the consumer 
sent a second letter via certified mail containing the same representations.119  
                                                     
114 While this article deals with defenses to PCA collection actions, it is interesting 
to note that the IRS appears to have substantially complied with the requirements 
of Code section 6304.  Since 2010, the IRS has closed only six cases for 
administrative violations under section 6304 and has cited no litigation arising 
under this statute.  Treas. Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Programming Changes 
Would Allow More Accurate Tracking of Fair Tax Collection Practices Violations, 
Ref. No. 2016-10-068 (September 14, 2016) (two violations); Treas. Inspector Gen. 
for Tax Admin., Review of Fair Tax Collection Practices Violation During Fiscal 
Year 2014, Ref. No. 2015-10-045 (May 28, 2015) (two violations); Treas. Inspector 
Gen. for Tax Admin., Review of Fair Tax Collection Practices Violation During 
Fiscal Year 2013, Ref. No. 2014-10-036 (May 27, 2014) (two violations); Treas. 
Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Potential Fair Tax Collection Practices Violations 
Were Inaccurately Coded, Ref. No. 2013-10-074 (July 3, 2013) (no violations 
recorded, but a significant number of cases were miscoded as unprofessional 
conduct cases instead of Fair Collection Tax Practices cases); Treas. Inspector Gen. 
for Tax Admin., No Fair Tax Collection Practices Violations Were Closed in 
Fiscal Year 2011, Ref. No. 2012-10-044 (April 26, 2012) (no violations recorded); 
Treas. Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Collection Employees Adhered to Fair Tax 
Collection Practices During Fiscal Year 2010, Ref. No. 2011-10-045 (April 25, 
2011) (no violations recorded).  However, the IRS’s numbers may be misleading.  
It is very possible the low number of reported violations are the result of a lack of 
taxpayer knowledge regarding collection rights or inadequate remedies to 
compensate for violations. 
115 Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch, and Chargo, P.A., 738 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (D. Ariz. 
2010). 
116 Id. at 989.  
117 Id. The consumer’s written communication stated, “[k]indly don’t bother me 
anymore.”  The court determined that this statement was sufficient to be classified 
as a request to cease communications.  Id. at 990, 994.   
118 Id. at 990. 
119 Id.  
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The debt collector signed the return receipt.120  The debt collector made at 
least one additional contact after receipt of the second letter.121  
 
In responding to the consumer’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court held the debt collector liable for contacting the consumer after receiving 
notice that she was represented by an attorney.122  The court made a 
distinction between the phone contacts made after the first letter and second 
letter.123  The court determined an issue of fact remained as to whether the 
debt collector had notice of representation after the first letter, because the 
debt collector disputed receipt.124  However, there was no dispute as to 
whether the debt collector had actual notice after signing the return receipt, 
and therefore it was liable for contacts made to the consumer after receipt of 
the second letter.125        
           
  In Buckley v. Afni, Inc., the debt collector was attempting to collect 
a debt from a consumer represented by an attorney.126  In 2012, the debt 
collector received a letter from the consumer’s attorney informing the 
collector that the consumer was represented by an attorney for all debts that 
may be subject to collection.127  The representation letter provided detailed 
identifying information about the consumer, including her former last name 
and last four digits of her social security number.128  In 2013, the consumer 
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.129 Notice of the bankruptcy was sent to 
the debt collector, which showed that the consumer was represented by the 
same attorney.130  The consumer received a discharge of the debt at issue.131 
                                                     
120 Id. 
121 Isham, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
122 Id. at 993. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that a paralegal signed for 
the certified letter and the letter was subsequently lost, never reaching the debt 
collector handling the case. Id. at 990.  The court also noted that the debt collector 
received a phone call from the consumer, during which the consumer informed the 
debt collector that she had retained an attorney. Id. In response to the consumer’s 
claimed representation, the debt collector placed an unknown adverse attorney code 
(“XATTY”) on the consumer’s account. Id. The court noted that even if the debt 
collector had not received the second letter, which constituted actual notice, it still 
had actual notice of attorney representation as evidenced by the XATTY code 
placed on the account after the phone communication. Id. at 993.    
126 Buckley v. Afni, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145-46 (S.D. Ind. 2016).    
127 Id. at 1146. 
128 Id. at 1145. 
129 Id.   
130 Id.  
131 Buckley, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1145.  
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Several months after the discharge, the debt collector sent a collection letter 
directly to the consumer.132    
 
The court held that the debt collector illegally contacted the 
consumer.133 In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the debt 
collector’s defense of lack of knowledge regarding the consumer’s 
representation.134 The court reasoned that the attorney’s letter and the 
bankruptcy notice sufficiently identified the consumer to put the debt 
collector on notice of the representation.135   
 
The debt collector’s lack of knowledge defense in Buckley was 
unsuccessful, but this defense has been effective in other cases. In Bacelli v. 
MFP, Inc., the consumer’s attorney filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on 
her behalf to obtain relief from her creditors.136  The creditor’s debt was listed 
on the bankruptcy petition and notice of the filing was delivered to the 
creditor.137  After the debt was discharged, the creditor forwarded the debt to 
a debt collector, MFP.138  Unaware of the bankruptcy filing (containing 
notice of the consumer’s representation) or the subsequent discharge, MFP 
sent the consumer a collection letter.139   
 
The court held that MFP did not illegally contact the consumer 
because it lacked knowledge of the consumer’s representation.140 MFP never 
obtained actual knowledge that the consumer had hired an attorney.141 
Further, the court declined to impute the creditor’s knowledge to the agent, 
MFP, to create liability under the FDCPA.142   
 
                                                     
132 Id. at 1146. 
133 Id. at 1150. 
134 Id. at 1149-50. 
135 Id. (noting that the debt collector attempted to draw a distinction between the 
consumer’s identification of “AKA Smock,” the consumer’s former last name as 
compared to the proper identification of “FKA Smock,” which would have been 
the proper acronym.  The court was not persuaded by this technicality, and noted 
that the most important piece of the acronym was “KA,” or known as. Therefore, 
the debt collector had sufficient knowledge as to the identity of the consumer). Id. 
at 1149.   
136 Bacelli v. MFP, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2010).  
137 Id. at 1330-31(stating, importantly, while the creditor’s debt was listed on the 
plaintiff’s bankruptcy mailing matrix, the debt collector was not listed.  Further, the 
debt collector received no other actual notice from the bankruptcy court, the 
consumer, or the creditor). Id. at 1331. 
138 Id. at 1331. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1334. 
141 Bacelli, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. 
142 Id. 
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Isham, Buckley, and Bacelli highlight several important taxpayer 
representation issues.  First, taxpayers need documentation of notice given to 
PCAs and the IRS concerning their representation.143  Return receipts will 
likely be the best way to prove that the debt collector received actual notice.  
Second, taxpayers need to adequately identify themselves in the notice to 
ensure that the debt collector cannot claim it lacked knowledge due to 
inadequate identification.  Use of social security numbers, maiden names, 
“doing business as,” and account numbers should clarify the taxpayer’s 
identity and put the PCA on notice of representation.   
 
Third, if a tax receivable is transferred to a PCA, taxpayers may want 
to file a second notice of representation with the PCA (assuming an initial 
form 2848 was on file with the IRS).  PCAs will not have actual notice of 
taxpayer representation unless the IRS provides this notification.144  Further, 
courts will probably not impute IRS knowledge of taxpayer representation to 
the PCA.145  Taxpayers who have individuals representing them before the 
IRS want to ensure these professionals negotiate with the IRS.  If PCAs are 
not required to work with taxpayer representatives, the collection outcome 
may result in the taxpayer paying more tax or agreeing to an installment 
agreement for a shorter term than necessary.  In either case, the taxpayer will 
be negatively impacted.  Taxpayers must protect their rights by requiring the 
PCA to communicate with their representative to achieve the best result.  
 
                                                     
143 While it was not discussed in the FTCP portion of the article, the FTCP only 
prevents direct communication with the taxpayer when the IRS knows the taxpayer 
is represented by a person authorized to practice before the agency.  As a result, if a 
taxpayer is going to assert a claim under § 6304(a)(2), the taxpayer will need to 
prove the IRS had notice of his representation. I.R.C. § 6304(a)(2) (2012). 
144 Generally, returns and return information are confidential. I.R.C. § 6103 (2016). 
Therefore, PCAs will not have knowledge of taxpayer representation absent IRS 
disclosure. 
145 Schmitt v. FMA Alliance, 398 F.3d 995, 997-98 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
there is no special exception to general agency law in the FDCPA); Randolph v. 
IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the creditor’s 
knowledge of the consumer’s counsel contained in the creditor’s file could not be 
imputed to the debtor to create liability under the FDCPA); contra Micare v. Foster 
& Garbus, 132 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80-81(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating debt collectors must 
maintain some procedures to determine whether a consumer is represented and if 
such procedures are lacking the creditor’s knowledge will be imputed to the debt 
collector to prevent a blatant circumvention of the purposes of the FDCPA); contra 
Powers v. Prof’l Credit Servs., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that the creditor’s knowledge the consumer was represented by counsel 
was imputed to the debt collector where the creditor intentionally withheld such 
information from the debt collector).  In light of the foregoing case law, it will be 
interesting to see if IRS knowledge will be imputed to the PCA where the PCA 
lacks actual knowledge, but the IRS or the PCA failed to establish proper 
procedures to identify taxpayer representatives.  
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2. Communications with Third Parties 
 
The FTCP146 controls PCA communications with a third party in 
connection with the collection of a tax.  PCAs may not contact a third party 
in connection with the collection of an assessment unless they provide 
reasonable notice in advance to the taxpayer that contacts may be made.147  
If a PCA contacts a third party in connection with the collection of a tax, it 
must periodically inform taxpayers of the persons contacted.148  Taxpayers 
may request this information at any time and a report must be provided.149  
   
 To a certain extent, the FTCP compromises collection rights 
existing under the FDCPA.  Under the FDCPA, private debt collectors are 
not allowed to contact third parties in connection with collection of a debt 
unless they receive consent from the consumer.150  Consequently, PCAs have 
more legal authority with whom they may contact to collect inactive tax 
receivables than when they are collecting private debts.   
 
Third party contacts in connection with the collection of a debt 
should be distinguished from contacts made to locate a taxpayer.  Clearly, a 
PCA would be unable to provide advance notice to a taxpayer if the PCA 
does not know where the taxpayer is located.  Therefore, when a PCA is 
merely trying to locate a taxpayer, the FTCP is not controlling.   
 
 Thus, PCAs may contact third parties to locate a taxpayer.151  
However, when PCAs contact third parties they are limited in the substance 
of their communications.  Generally, PCAs may not (1) discuss the debt or 
communicate in any way that they are in the debt collection business, (2) 
communicate with the same third party more than once, or (3) communicate 
via post card.152  PCAs must identify themselves and state that they are 
                                                     
146 As noted previously, this article is generally referring to the FTCP as rights 
arising under the Code.  Communications with third parties are specifically 
controlled by I.R.C. § 7602(c) (2017).    
147 I.R.C. § 7602(c)(1) (2017).  There are several exceptions to this general rule.  
Specifically, third party contacts are allowed without notice if (1) consent is given, 
(2) providing notice would jeopardize collection, (3) notice could result in harm to 
someone, and (4) contact is made in connection with a pending criminal 
investigation.  I.R.C. § 7602(c)(3) (2017). 
148 I.R.C. § 7602(c)(2) (2017). 
149 Id. 
150 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2012).  Courts of competent jurisdiction may also 
provide authorization for third party contacts. In certain instances, debt collectors 
may also be able to communicate with third parties in connection with the 
collection of a debt if it is reasonably necessary to carry out a post judgment 
judicial remedy. Id. 
151 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2012). 
152 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2)-(5) (2012). 
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confirming location information, but they may disclose the identity of their 
employer only if the third party requests such information.153  
 
Debt collectors have been held liable for improperly contacting third 
parties.  In Clayson v. Rubin & Rothman, L.L.C., the debt collector attempted 
to collect a debt by contacting the consumer’s mother.154 The debt collector 
left two messages on the mother’s answering machine disclosing that the 
consumer owed a debt, which was being collected by a debt collector.155 The 
mother’s telephone number was not provided by the consumer, nor did the 
consumer consent to communication with her mother.156 Despite a jury 
verdict to the contrary, the court held the debt collector liable as a matter of 
law for illegally contacting the consumer’s mother in connection with the 
collection of a debt.157   
 
In Jackson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., the court held a debt 
collector accountable for illegally communicating, in connection with the 
collection of a debt, with the consumer’s employer without the consumer’s 
consent.158 The debt collector sent a fax to the consumer’s employer to verify 
the consumer’s employment status.159 The fax identified the consumer and 
contained a header with the word “COLLECTION” in all capital letters.160 
The debt collector argued that the fax was not a communication as defined 
by the FDCPA and, therefore, no violation occurred.161 The court disagreed, 
                                                     
153 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1) (2012). 
154 Clayson v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, 751 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493 (W.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
155 Id. at 495. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 496. The court reached this conclusion by relying on two different pieces 
of evidence. First, the debt collector conceded at trial that if someone overheard the 
messages left on the consumer’s mother’s answering machine, the person would 
know that the consumer owed a debt and that the debt collector was attempting to 
collect the debt. Id. at 495. Second, the consumer’s mother’s decision to give the 
debt collector some of the consumer’s medical records, which was relevant to the 
consumer’s ability to pay, without the consumer’s consent would only have 
occurred if the mother had discussed the debt with the debt collector. Clayson, 
supra note 156 at 495-96.     
158 Jackson v. Eltman, Eltman, & Cooper PC, 128 F. Supp. 3d 980, 986 (E.D. Mich. 
2015). 
159 Id. at 982. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 983. The debt collector cited two cases that held a fax and a phone call 
from a debt collector did not amount to a communication from the debt collector 
for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. at 984. In analyzing both cases, the court 
distinguished the communications from the facts in the present case, noting that 
neither communication referenced the debt, and therefore persons receiving the 
information would be required to make inferences to determine the consumer owed 
a debt. Id. at 984-86 (citing Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1177 
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noting that the FDCPA defined communication as the “conveying of 
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any 
medium.”162 Consequently, because a communication occurred (as defined 
in the FDCPA) with a third party without the consumer’s consent, the debt 
collector was liable for violations of the FDCPA.163   
  
 When the IRS implemented its private debt collection program in 
2006, it administratively restricted the communications that PCAs could 
make to third parties. PCAs were prohibited from calling or writing third 
parties (i.e., employers, banks, neighbors) to obtain information about the 
taxpayer’s financial health.164 However, PCAs were allowed to contact the 
taxpayer’s spouse or leave messages on an answering machine in an attempt 
to locate the taxpayer.165 Once a PCA knew how to contact a taxpayer, it was 
not allowed to contact third parties.166 It is very likely that the IRS will issue 
similar guidance to PCAs under the current private debt collection regime. 
 
 In light of the conflicting statutes, case law, and administrative 
guidance, it is important to summarize what rights taxpayers have with 
respect to PCA third party contacts. PCAs are legally allowed to contact third 
parties to collect a tax debt without the consent of the taxpayer if they provide 
notice prior to making such contacts.167 This would require some advance 
communication to the taxpayer, most likely in a letter. However, the IRS will 
likely restrict these communications, with exceptions for discussions and 
messages left with spouses and parents.168 PCAs will not be allowed to 
contact the taxpayer’s employer, bank, or neighbor to assess the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay.169 PCAs will not have the same discretion to contact third 
parties as is available to IRS employees.     
     
PCAs may be liable under Code section 7433A for improper third 
party contacts if they rush the collection process or disclose too much 
information when attempting to locate the taxpayer.170 One important issue 
will be the timing of advance notice provided to the taxpayer and the timing 
of third party contacts. Taxpayers clearly have a right to know the names of 
                                                     
(10th Cir. 2011); Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assoc., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d. 694, 
704-05 (D. Minn. 2012).    
162 Id. at 983 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(2) (2012)). 
163 Id. at 985. The debt collector was held liable for violating sections 1692(b)(5) 
and 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. 
164 I.R.S. Announcement 2006-63, 2006-2 C.B. 445, 2006 WL 2423308.   
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 I.R.C. § 7602(c)(1) (2017). 
168 See I.R.S. Announcement, supra note 166. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 446.  
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the third parties that PCAs contact.171 The right to this information will assist 
in asserting a claim for improper third party contact.  Taxpayers can review 
the timing of the advance notice, if any, and the third party data provided by 
the PCAs to determine if a violation occurred. If PCAs are attempting to 
locate a taxpayer, the holdings in Clayson172 and Jackson173 would give rise 
to legal claims under section 7433A.174 
 
3. Ceasing Communication 
 
The FTCP does not speak to taxpayer rights concerning ceasing 
communications. As a result, FDCPA private collection rights concerning 
ceasing communications are incorporated into qualified collection 
contracts.175 Taxpayers may defend themselves from PCA collection action 
by requesting in writing that the PCA cease communications.176 If a taxpayer 
makes a written request to a PCA to stop contacting him by phone and/or 
                                                     
171 I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015); I.R.C. § 7602(c)(2) (2017). 
172 Clayson, supra note 156 at 495-96.  
173 Jackson, supra note 160 at 983-85.  
174 If PCAs violate administrative guidance it is unlikely they will be subject to 
legal liability, but it could impact their ability to retain the qualified collection 
contract. For example, if PCAs provide taxpayers with advance notice that third 
party contacts may be made and they contact the taxpayer’s bank to obtain 
collection information, this contact would not give rise to a legal claim under 
section 7433A, but it could impact the PCA’s ability to retain the qualified 
collection contract. Clayson, supra note 156 at 495-96; Jackson, supra note 160 at 
983-85; I.R.C § 7433A(a) (2012). 
175 I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2012). 
176 Id. This defense may be particularly useful to taxpayers. The Taxpayer 
Advocate has identified an issue within the new Policy and Procedures Guide for 
Private Collection Agencies, which allows the PCAs to request “voluntary” 
payments when the taxpayer is unable to make a full lump sum payment of the 
liability or establish a five-year installment agreement.  The Taxpayer Advocate is 
concerned that these voluntary payment solicitations are outside the scope of the 
permissible services PCAs can perform pursuant to section 6306. Discussions have 
taken place with the IRS Commissioner, bringing this issue to his attention. The 
Commissioner agreed to limit the voluntary payments, which PCAs can accept to 
only one payment.  However, it does not appear that this agreement has been 
formally added to the Policy and Procedures Guide. Further, even if such an 
agreement is formalized, it would not limit the communications which could occur 
to obtain the voluntary payment.  Consequently, taxpayers may need to utilize this 
communications defense if their account is referred to a PCA and they are unable to 
resolve the liability.  Taxpayer Advocate Service, Private Debt Collection (PDC): 
The IRS Is Implementing a PDC Program in a Manner That Is Arguably 
Inconsistent With the Law and That Unnecessarily Burdens Taxpayers, Especially 
Those Experiencing Economic Hardship, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2016), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-
ARC/ARC16_Volume1_MSP_12_PDC.pdf (last visited May 1, 2017). 
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mail, the PCA must cease general communications.177 After receipt of the 
written request, PCAs may communicate with taxpayers only to advise the 
taxpayer that collection efforts are being terminated.178 The language in the 
FDCPA broadly defines the “consumer” as the debtor’s spouse, parent (if 
debtor is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.179 As a result, several 
different individuals may file a written request with the PCA. As a practical 
matter, the IRS will likely restrict PCAs from making multiple 
communications with the individuals (other than the taxpayer) defined in the 
FDCPA as “consumers,” leaving the taxpayer as the only individual who will 
mail a cease communications request to the PCA.180 
 
Debt collectors have failed to comply with consumer requests to 
cease communications.  In Webster v. ACB Receivables Management, Inc., 
the debt collector was required to pay damages for failing to cease 
communications after the consumer’s request to cease and desist.181  The debt 
collector was attempting to collect a disputed debt from a consumer.182 The 
consumer requested validation of the debt from the debt collector, but the 
debt collector responded by requesting information to identify the 
consumer.183 The consumer responded to the information request with a 
cease and desist letter to prevent further communication between the 
parties.184  The debt collector failed to honor the cease and desist request, and 
instead mailed an additional letter to the consumer requesting information.185 
                                                     
177 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2012). 
178 Id. The FDCPA does allow debt collectors to communicate with consumers 
regarding its ability or intention to invoke specific remedies to collect a debt. 
However, since the Code defines and limits the services which PCAs can perform 
pursuant to a qualified collection contract, communications regarding remedies 
cannot be made, as these actions would be outside the scope of the statute.  I.R.C. § 
6306(b)(1) (2015). 
179 15. U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (2012).  
180 See Internal Rev. Service, Internal Revenue Bull. No. 2006-37, Overview of the 
IRS’s Use of Private Collection Agencies (PCAs) in 2006 (2006), 2263 C.B. 445.  
In 2006, PCAs were generally restricted from communicating with third parties 
during the course of their collection activity for the IRS. However, PCAs were 
allowed to speak with intermediaries in an attempt to locate the taxpayer by phone. 
Intermediaries included a taxpayer’s spouse, and probably encompassed the 
individuals defined as “consumers” in section 1692c(d). However, once a PCA 
knew how to contact a taxpayer the PCA was not allowed to contact these 
intermediaries. While this guidance is quite old, it is likely that similar guidance 
will be issued. As a result, in 2017, the intermediaries or “consumers” will be 
unlikely to file a written request with the PCA to cease communications due to the 
restrictions the IRS will place on PCA third party communications. Id.  
181 Webster v. ACB Receivables Management, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d. 619, 637 (D. 
Md. 2014). 
182 Id. at 623. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 623-24. 
185 Id. at 624. 
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The court held the debt collector liable for violation of the FDCPA for 
communicating with a consumer after receipt of a written request to cease 
communications.186 
 
In Hagen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., the debt collector was held 
liable for contacting a consumer after receipt of a letter containing a request 
to cease communications.187 The debt collector, a law firm, obtained a 
judgment against the consumer for failing to pay a debt.188 The consumer’s 
attorney sent the debt collector a cease and desist letter that stated “pursuant 
to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, [consumer] wants no further non-
litigation contact from you or any other debt collector to whom the above 
account may be assigned or sold.”189 The debt collector sent several non-
litigation collection letters to the consumer after receipt of consumer’s 
letter.190 The court held the debt collector liable for violation of the FDCPA’s 
cease and desist requirement.191 Although court noted the consumer’s letter 
was somewhat ambiguous, it reasoned that no reasonable interpretation of 
the consumer’s letter would have allowed additional collection letters to be 
sent to the consumer.192  
 
While cease and desist letters are an effective way to protect against 
annoying, harassing, or unethical debt collectors, if a consumer or taxpayer 
incurs additional debts after the mailing of such letter, the debt collector may 
be able to resume collection efforts with respect to new debts.  In Udell v. 
Kansas Counselors, Inc., a debt collector legally communicated with a 
consumer after receipt of a cease and desist letter because the communication 
related to future debts.193 In 2001, the debt collector began efforts to collect 
certain debts from the consumer.194 In March of 2003, the consumer sent the 
                                                     
186 Webster, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 626. It should be noted that the debt collector raised 
the bona fide error affirmative defense, but such defense was unsuccessful. This 
defense will be discussed in detail in the remedies section of this paper. 
187 Hagen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 85 F. Supp. 3d. 1028, 1032 (D. Minn. 
2015). 
188 Id. at 1030. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1032. 
192 Hagen, 85 F. Supp. 3d. at 1031 (noting that in addition to claiming the 
consumer’s letter was ambiguous, the debt collector argued that the consumer’s 
letter was invalid because it was sent by the consumer’s attorney and not directly 
by the consumer. The court noted that the FDCPA’s definition of consumer did not 
include the consumer’s attorney, but it offsets this concern by referencing a lack of 
authority discrediting a letter sent by a consumer’s attorney. The court stated there 
it would need to be express authority to discount the attorney’s letter, and no such 
authority exists).    
193 Udell v. Kan. Counselors, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d. 1135, 1142-43 (D. Kan. 2004). 
194 Id. at 1136-37. 
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debt collector a cease and desist letter with respect to “[a]ll [a]ccounts.”195  
The debt collector ceased communications with the debtor after receipt of the 
letter.196 In May of 2003, the debt collector received five new debts for the 
same consumer.197 The debt collector called the consumer several times in an 
attempt to collect the new debts, but was unsuccessful.198 The consumer 
argued that the phone calls related to the new debts were in violation of the 
FDCPA because the consumer had mailed the debt collector a cease and 
desist letter.199 The court disagreed.200 The court’s opinion primarily 
analyzed the plain language of the statute, noting that it limits the application 
of cease and desist letters to existing debts, not future debts.201         
  
Udell raises an important issue for taxpayers and their 
representatives may wish to cease communications with the PCAs and may 
do so by executing a written cease and desist letter.202 However, due to the 
nature of the annually recurring tax reporting periods and potential tax 
receivables associated with such reporting periods, new debts could be 
assigned to the same PCA for collection after receipt of a cease and desist 
letter. If such a scenario arises, the taxpayer should file a subsequent cease 
and desist letter with the PCA to prevent further communications. Udell 
effectively requires a new cease and desist letter for each tax year.  
 
Cease and desist letters may be a particularly useful tool in light of 
PCA’s limited collection authority. As noted previously, PCAs can only 
locate taxpayers, obtain financial information, request full payment of the tax 
receivable, or offer an installment agreement for a term not to exceed five 
years.203  Therefore, PCAs cannot resolve a liability by providing a taxpayer 
with an offer in compromise, nor can they reduce the amount of the 
receivable if there is a dispute as to the underlying liability.204  Consequently, 
                                                     
195 Id. at 1137. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Udell, 313 F. Supp. 2d. at 1137 (noting that while phone calls were placed to the 
consumer’s phone number, the complaint alleged that no one at the plaintiff’s home 
answered the phone calls, and no messages were left for the consumer). 
199 Id. at 1138. 
200 Id. at 1142-43. 
201 Id. at 1140-43 (finding the Udell Court also analyzed an informal advisory letter 
issued by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the FTC letter addressed the 
existing versus future debt issue with respect to debt collector communications. 
The FTC reached the same conclusion as the Udell Court).        
202 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) (2012). 
203 I.R.C. § 6306(b)(1) (2015). 
204 IRS settlement officers can provide taxpayers with a reduced tax liability based 
on the reasonable collection potential of a particular account. These liability 
reductions normally come in the form of offers in compromise, doubt as to 
collectability. IRM § 5.8.4.3. However, some taxpayers may submit an offer in 
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taxpayers may determine that it is in their best interest to send the PCA a 
cease and desist letter and attempt to resolve their tax receivable with the 
IRS.   
 
4. Harassment and Abuse 
 
The FTCP prevents PCA employees from engaging in conduct to 
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a 
tax debt.205  Unlawful conduct includes, but is not limited to, (1) threats, use 
of violence, or other criminal means to harm a person, the person’s 
reputation, or property, (2) use of obscene language to abuse the debtor, (3) 
calling the debtor repeatedly or continuously to annoy, abuse, or harass the 
debtor, and (4) generally, calling without meaningful disclosure of 
identity.206 
 
There are virtually no reported cases dealing with IRS instances of 
taxpayer harassment or abuse in connection with the collection of a tax.  The 
limited cases that do exist were mostly disposed of on procedural grounds.207  
However, one case has been litigated in which the taxpayer alleged IRS abuse 
and harassment.  In Gessert v. United States, the taxpayers were a corporation 
and its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), both of which failed to pay 
employment taxes pursuant to the Federal Income Contribution Act 
(“FICA”).208  Because the corporation failed to pay the FICA taxes, also 
known as trust-fund taxes, the IRS assessed a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty 
against the taxpayer to personally collect the corporate trust-fund taxes. 209  
The corporation and the CEO alleged that the IRS employee exhibited 
aggressive, abrupt, and threatening behavior during collection activities.210  
The district court disagreed.211  Employing a reasonableness standard, the 
court stated the evidence only revealed that the IRS employee displayed 
aggressive and persistent conduct.212  The court noted that the IRS employee 
                                                     
compromise to reduce the amount of the liability. These offers are commonly 
referred to as doubt as to liability offers. IRM § 4.18.2. 
205 I.R.C. § 6304(b) (2012). 
206 Id. 
207 Marsoun v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2012) (taxpayer 
claimed the IRS harassed, oppressed, or abused him in the course of collecting tax, 
but no facts were pled to support such a claim); Scott v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 
2d 73, 81 (D.D.C. 2009) (taxpayer’s claim the IRS agents engaged in conduct to 
harass, oppress, or abuse them in connection with the collection of taxes failed to 
plead sufficient facts upon which relief could be granted). 
208 Gessert v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (E.D. Wis. 2009), aff’d, 703 
F.3d 1028 (2013). 
209 Id. at 946. 
210 Id. at 950. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
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did not place harassing phone calls, commit criminal acts, or threaten 
violence.213   
 
In contrast to IRS employees, debt collectors have been held liable 
for harassing and abusing consumers in connection with collection of a debt.  
In U.S. v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., the Department of Justice brought 
suit against a private debt collector for sweeping violations of the FDCPA.214  
The government was successful in proving the debt collector engaged in 
abusive and harassing collection practices.215  Specifically, the debt collector 
made calls using (1) racial slurs, (2) terms like “liar, deadbeat, crook,” and  
(3) profane language such as “the judge doesn’t give a f[***] about your 
complaint.”216  The court utilized the “least sophisticated consumer” standard 
to hold the debt collector liable for FDCPA violations.217  The court’s remedy 
for the violations came in the form of civil penalties and injunctive relief.218  
The injunctive relief prohibited the debt collector from (1) threatening that 
the consumer’s credit would be destroyed, (2) stating that the person will be 
in trouble, (3) using obscene or profane language, and (4) suggesting that the 
consumer is a criminal.219     
  
In Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., the debt collector was 
required to pay damages for harassing the consumer over the telephone.220  
The debt collector attempted to collect a debt from the consumer for hospital 
services rendered.221  The debt collector began its collection efforts by 
sending a series of collection letters to the consumer.222  When the letters 
proved unsuccessful, the debt collector resorted to telephone 
communications, calling the consumer fourteen times over a thirty-day 
period.223  During the first call the debt collector asked the consumer about 
her ownership of valuable assets, including whether she owned a wedding 
ring.224  In a subsequent call, when the consumer offered to pay ten dollars a 
                                                     
213 Gessert, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 946. 
214 United States v. Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Tex. 
1986).  
215 Id. at 374-375. 
216 Id. at 375-76. 
217 Id. at 375. (“Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the test is not 
whether ‘a reasonable consumer’ would be deceived, misled or harassed by the 
prohibited practices – because the Act is intended to protect ‘unsophisticated 
consumers.’ Therefore, the court must look not only at the ‘reasonable consumer,’ 
but also to a less sophisticated consumer in determining whether the debt collection 
practices act has a tendency or capacity to deceive”) (citations omitted). 
218 Id. at 383-387.  
219 Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F. Supp. at 385-86. 
220 Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 875-76 (D.N.D. 1981). 
221 Id. at 867. 
222 Id. at 867-68. 
223 Id. at 868-69. 
224 Id. at 868. 
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week, the debt collector said that the offer was insufficient and stated “she 
shouldn’t have children if she couldn’t afford them.”225  The court applied 
the “least sophisticated consumer” standard to the debt collector’s 
communications, and determined that the debt collector’s comments about 
the consumer’s wedding ring and the statement regarding childbearing were 
personal and egregious, the natural consequence of which was to harass.226 
 
One of the critical factors in determining whether a PCA will be held 
liable for harassing or abusing a taxpayer during collection activities is the 
applicable standard.  In Gessert, the district court appeared to apply a 
reasonable person standard.227  In Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. and 
Bingham, the courts utilized the least sophisticated consumer standard.228  
While the conduct in Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. would likely have 
offended a reasonable person, it is not entirely clear whether a reasonable 
person would have been harassed by the conduct in Bingham.  Of significant 
importance is the fact that Gessert appears to have employed the reasonable 
person standard, and that case dealt directly with Code section 6304(b).  
However, it is very possible that a court would select the least sophisticated 
consumer standard in a case brought by a taxpayer against a PCA.    
 
While it is likely courts will use the least sophisticated consumer test, 
its use will not correspond to various tax law standards that generally favor 
the government.  Collection due process cases involving tax liens and levies 
place the burden on the taxpayer to prove that the government abused its 
discretion by sustaining the use of the lien or levy.229  Tax deficiency cases 
generally place the burden of proof on the taxpayer to prove that the notice 
of deficiency is incorrect.230  Courts will depart from the norms cited above 
due to the fact that the defendant will be a private actor verses a public actor.  
The applicable standards utilized by FDCPA case law become more relevant 
in light of the correlation between the purpose of the FDCPA and the nature 
of the debt collector. 
 
                                                     
225 Bingham, supra note 222 at 869. 
226 Id. at 870-75 (A psychologist was utilized to assess the damage caused by the 
debt collector’s conduct. The psychologist determined that the consumer had 
become unhappy, nauseous, distrustful of telephones, lost sleep, and suffered 
headaches and nightmares. Despite such proof, the jury only awarded the consumer 
and her husband $1,100 in actual damages and another $400 in statutory damages. 
Id. at 875. This article will address damage issues in detail in part IV). 
227 Gessert v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946-950 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
228United States v. Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 370, 375 (N.D. 
Tex. 1986); Bingham, 505 F. Supp. at 870-71.  
229 Keller v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 710, 715-716 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Comm’r, 
T.C.M. (RIA) 2007-29, *4; Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 93 (2004).  
230 TAX CT. R. 142(a)(1). 
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Taxpayers should be aware of their rights when communicating with 
PCAs.  If a PCA engages in abusive or harassing behavior, taxpayers should 
document the behavior.  If the behavior continues, taxpayers have a duty to 
fight back against such actions and protect themselves.  At the very least, 
taxpayers should inform the IRS of the PCA’s collection tactics to ensure that 
the IRS prevents its contractors from acting illegally in the future.    
 
5. Validation of a Debt 
 
Taxpayers who are contacted by PCAs may be surprised to find out 
that they have outstanding tax liabilities.  Taxpayers may be unaware of their 
tax liabilities for a number of reasons, including (1) a lack of notice of 
automatic assessments of failure to file, failure to pay, or estimated tax 
penalties,231 (2) deficiency assessments stemming from defaulted notices of 
deficiency, where the notice was not sent to the taxpayer’s last known 
address, (3) a lack of communication between the taxpayer and CPA, (4) a 
failure to submit all tax payments, and (5) the embezzlement of employment 
tax deposits by an employee.  As taxpayers become aware of the outstanding 
assessments, they may wish to challenge the assessments.   
 
The FDCPA’s incorporation into Code section 6306 provides 
taxpayers with the ability to challenge the validity of the debt.232  Legally, 
taxpayers will have a thirty-day period following receipt of the initial notice 
from the PCA to challenge the validity of the tax debt.233  Administratively, 
it is likely that the taxpayer will still be able to dispute the debt after the 
thirty-day period.234  Taxpayers need to be aware of their right to dispute the 
liability as it could significantly impact the amount of tax that they are 
required to pay. 
 
If a taxpayer informs the PCA that he wishes to dispute the tax 
liability, the PCA will be required to return the account to the IRS for 
processing.235  Taxpayer disputes will take various forms.  Taxpayers may 
request audit reconsideration.  Audit consideration is a valid request for 
taxpayers who have filed a tax return, must identify the specific adjustment 
in dispute, and have additional information for consideration.236  To properly 
request audit consideration, it is likely that the taxpayer will need a copy of 
                                                     
231 I.R.C. §§ 6665(a)-(b) (2017). 
232 See I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015). 
233 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)-(b) (2012). 
234 Section 12.15, Taxpayer Disputes, Private Collection Agency (PCA) Policy and 
Procedures Guide (2008 version) (the author is aware that a subsequent policy and 
procedures guide has been issued to PCAs. The author submitted a FOIA request to 
the IRS to obtain the new Policy and Procedures Guide, but this request was denied 
by the IRS citing a policy exemption). 
235 Id. 
236 IRM § 4.13.1.4.  
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the revenue agent report or notice of deficiency to identify specific 
adjustments.  Taxpayers can obtain this information using Freedom of 
Information Act requests.   
 
Taxpayers may also wish to dispute the liability or the amount they 
are required to pay by using an offer in compromise.237  Offers in compromise 
that dispute the amount of the liability are classified as doubt as to liability.238  
Offers in compromise that attempt to decrease the amount of tax that 
taxpayers are required to pay due to financial hardships are classified as 
doubt as to collectability.239 Offers in compromise that attempt to decrease 
the amount of tax that taxpayers are required to pay due to financial hardships 
are classified as doubt as to collectability.240  
 
Evaluation of offers in compromise vary depending on the 
classification of the offer.  If an offer is classified as doubt as to liability, the 
evaluation will likely be made by a revenue agent.  The agent will perform a 
normal audit of documentation provided by the taxpayer to determine if the 
liability should be reduced.  To perform this analysis, the revenue agent will 
need to obtain the administrative file containing the audit work papers.  
Taxpayers should seriously consider disputing a liability if the tax liability is 
old.  Offers based on doubt as to liability cannot be rejected solely because 
the IRS cannot locate the taxpayer’s return or associated administrative 
file.241  Over time the IRS has a tendency to misplace taxpayer information.  
As a result, it is possible a taxpayer could obtain a reduction of the tax 
liability by merely submitting an offer based upon doubt as to liability.  
 
If an offer is made based on doubt as to collectability, the evaluation 
will likely be made by a settlement officer.242  The settlement officer’s 
analysis of how much tax can be collected will include allowances for basic 
living expenses, preventing the taxpayer from living below the poverty 
level.243  Taxpayers who are experiencing financial hardships should consider 
making an offer in compromise based on doubt as to collectability. 
                                                     
237 See I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2014). 
238 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(1) (2002). 
239 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2002). All offers in compromises must be 
submitted on Form 656 to be valid. Bergdale v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-152, at 
*4 (July 30, 2016); see also; Godwin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-289, at *11 
(Oct. 14, 2003). 
240 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2002). All offers in compromises must be 
submitted on Form 656 to be valid. Bergdale v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-152, at 
*4 (July 30, 2016); see also; Godwin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-289, at *11 
(Oct. 14, 2003). 
241 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(4). 
242 Settlement officers will determine what a taxpayer’s reasonable collection 
potential is by reviewing the taxpayer’s Collection Information Statement, 
submitted on Form 433-A. I.R.S. IRM § 5.8.5.3.1. 
243 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(c)(2)(i). 
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Taxpayers should not be intimidated when PCAs contact them to 
collect tax liabilities.  If taxpayers believe that the IRS has erroneously 
calculated their tax liability, they should dispute the liability within thirty 
days of receipt of the first contact by the PCA.  Even if taxpayers believe that 
the tax liability is correct, but they cannot afford to repay the full amount of 
the debt, they should inform the PCA that they wish to compromise the debt 
based on doubt as to collectability.  Taxpayers should not be bullied into an 
installment agreement for the full amount of the debt when they cannot 
reasonably pay the full balance.  Taxpayers have rights to dispute the debt 
and ensure that they pay only the amount of tax legally required.   
 
The bundle of taxpayer collection rights discussed in this part is 
significant.  Taxpayers must exercise their rights to ensure they pay only the 
correct amount of tax and at the correct intervals.  Knowledge and application 
of these rights will deter illegal PCA conduct and provide a basis for taxpayer 
remedies.  
 
IV. TAXPAYER REMEDIES 
 
Inevitably, PCAs will violate taxpayer collection rights during the 
course of their collection activities.  In certain instances, taxpayers may feel 
so aggrieved that they wish to seek judicial redress.  This portion of the article 
will discuss legal and factual issues surrounding obtaining a judicial remedy 
for violations of taxpayer collection rights.  The analysis of taxpayer 
remedies will also propose Congressional amendments, where necessary, to 
bolster the impact of taxpayer collection laws. 
 
As examined in part three, taxpayer rights are generally provided by 
two separate bodies of law, the FTCP and the FDCPA.  Fittingly, there are 
two separate statutory bases for recovery.  This part will begin by discussing 
the legal requirements for filing a claim with respect to FTCP violations.  The 
article will then discuss possible recoveries available to taxpayers for FTCP 
violations and propose Congressional amendments to the applicable statutory 
law.  This part will continue by analyzing the legal requirements for filing a 
claim in connection with FDCPA violations.  This section will conclude by 
examining potential taxpayer recoveries for FDCPA violations and propose 
a Congressional amendment to the FDCPA. 
 
A. Remedies Under Fair Tax Collection Practices    
 
Code section 7433A provides the statutory authority for civil damage 
awards stemming from FTCP violations.244  Accordingly, if PCAs illegally 
                                                     
244 I.R.C. § 7433A(a) (2012). The flush language of section 7433A(a) grafts in IRS 
employee violations arising in connection with the collection of a tax as noted in 
section 6306(b)(2). Section 6306(k)(1) also cross references section 7433A, to 
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(1) communicate with taxpayers, (2) harass and abuse taxpayers, or (3) 
contact third parties, section 7433A would be an appropriate basis for 
recovery.  
 
1. Legal Requirements for Fair Tax Collection Practices 
Claims 
 
Section 7433A incorporates section 7433 as the basis for taxpayer 
remedies, with several modifications.245  Taxpayers who file suit under 
section 7433A must file a claim in U.S. district court, identifying the 
defendant as the PCA.246  The jurisdiction for section 7433 and 7433A 
actions remain constant, but the defendant is no longer the IRS.  Although 
the PCA is acting on behalf of the IRS, the IRS is not liable for collection 
right violations committed during the performance of a qualified collection 
contract.247  Claims must be asserted by pleading facts that identify PCA 
conduct as intentional, reckless, or negligent.248   
 
The characterization of PCA conduct may significantly impact the 
amount of monetary damages that a taxpayer is awarded.  Damages for 
liability will be calculated by determining the actual, direct economic 
damages proximately caused by the PCA and the costs of the action.249  
However, these damages are capped at $1,000,000 for intentional or reckless 
conduct, and $100,000 for negligent conduct.250  Consequently, taxpayers 
should closely assess whether PCA conduct was merely negligent, or could 
be proven to be intentional or reckless.  Further, taxpayers must be sure that 
                                                     
direct the reader to the authority for damages. It should be noted, that section 
6304(c) contains a cross reference to section 7433, while section 7602(c) does not 
contain a similar reference. Notwithstanding, section 7602(c) clearly sets forth IRS 
employee acts or omissions in connection to collection of tax, and therefore would 
be the type of IRS employee prohibition described in section 6306(b)(2). 
245 I.R.C. §§ 7433A(a), (b) (2004). 
246 I.R.C. § 7433(a); I.R.C. § 7433A(b)(1) (1998).  
247 I.R.C. §§ 7433A(b)(1)-(2) (2004). 
248 I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1998). 
249 I.R.C. § 7433(b). Costs of the action must be distinguished from litigation costs. 
Costs of the action are limited to court clerk fees, marshal fees, court reporter fees, 
costs for copying and printing, docket fees, costs of compensation for court 
appointed experts or interpreters, and witness fees. Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1(c). In 
a normal case under section 7433, litigation fees would be recoverable by means of 
a separate motion for attorneys’ fees, with a showing the taxpayer was the 
prevailing party. Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1(b)(2); I.R.C. § 7430(a), (c)(4). 
However, under section 7433A the defendant is not the United States, so section 
7430 would not be the appropriate basis for recovering attorney’s fees. Cases 
brought under the FDCPA do provide for attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3). 
As a result, attorneys for taxpayers may need to consider if a cause of action could 
be filed under the FTCP, FDCPA, or both.             
250 I.R.C. § 7433(b) (1998) 
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the PCA conduct was the proximate cause of the damages.  The court must 
determine that the damages would not have occurred “but for” the PCA’s 
conduct for the taxpayer to prevail.  The statute of limitations for bringing a 
suit for such FTCP violations is two years after the cause of action accrues.251  
  
Taxpayers should be aware of two additional modifications to 
section 7433A that significantly impact their ability to obtain a remedy.  If a 
PCA engages in certain unauthorized collection actions while providing 
services under a qualified collection contract, section 7433A is not the 
exclusive remedy.252 This modification is a significant change from the plain 
language of section 7433(a), which states that 7433 is the exclusive remedy 
for IRS violations of taxpayer collection rights.253  While the FTCP 
supersedes the FDCPA, it appears these violations can be litigated under the 
FDCPA as well.254  However, as will be discussed, the standards of proof and 
statutes of limitations may vary depending on the source of the cause of 
action.   
 
Section 7433A also modifies section 7433’s requirement that IRS 
administrative remedies must be exhausted to obtain a judgment for 
damages.255  Clearly, if a taxpayer is successful in a suit against a PCA for a 
violation of taxpayer collection rights, he would not need to have previously 
pursued an administrative remedy from a party unrelated to the suit.  The 
statute properly excludes the IRS administrative exhaustion requirement, 
clearing the path for an award of damages.   
 
2. Taxpayer Recoveries for Fair Tax Collection Practices 
Violations 
 
As taxpayers decide whether or not to pursue a legal remedy, they 
will need to estimate the amount of damages recoverable if a PCA is found 
liable.  Damages cannot exceed $1,000,000 for intentional conduct and 
$100,000 for negligent conduct.256  Damages are defined as actual, direct 
economic damages proximately caused by the defendant and costs to bring 
                                                     
251 I.R.C. § 7433(d)(3) (1998). 
252 I.R.C. §§ 7433A(a), (b)(3) (2004). 
253 I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1998). The only exception to the exclusive remedy provision 
is if taxpayers file suit against the IRS for failure to release a lien. In such an 
instance, taxpayers may file a claim under Code section 7432.  
254 Where the FTCP and the FDCPA overlap, taxpayers will generally be able to 
litigate under Code section 7433A or FDCPA section 1692k. However, this is the 
case only if the laws are the same. If the FTCP expands taxpayer rights, then such 
rights would not be available under the FDCPA and therefore the remedy would 
only be available under section 7433A.   
255 I.R.C. § 7433A(b)(4) (2004); I.R.C. § 7433(d)(1) (1998).  
256 I.R.C. § 7433(b) (1998). 
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the action.257  Actual, direct economic damages are pecuniary damages.258  
Pecuniary damages relate to money or monetary affairs.259  Essentially, the 
damages sustained by a taxpayer must be quantified in monetary terms.  
Injuries classified as emotional distress or loss of reputation would be 
compensable only if the taxpayer could prove to have sustained an economic 
loss from the unauthorized collection action.260  While calculation of the 
amount of damages is a significant factor in initiating litigation, analysis of 
whether the PCA is the proximate cause for such damages may be the 
determinative factor. 
 
In Information Resources, Inc. v. United States, the taxpayer filed a 
claim for relief under section 7433 for damages sustained in connection with 
the government’s erroneous filing of a tax lien.261  During trial the 
government admitted that it erroneously filed a tax lien against the taxpayer’s 
property.262  The taxpayer claimed that the filing of the tax lien resulted in 
lost profits, a loss of goodwill, and costs for IRS representation.263  
Specifically, the taxpayer claimed that the filing of the tax lien caused its 
contract negotiations with a customer to fall through as well as a substantial 
impairment to goodwill.264 The district court awarded the taxpayer $1,000 in 
damages for costs of IRS representation and denied any recovery for lost 
profits and loss of goodwill.265  The appellate court sustained the district 
court’s opinion.266  The court cited the customer’s testimony, which stated 
that the tax lien “could be considered one of the reasons [for not doing 
business with the taxpayer] [b]ut it’s all speculative from that point 
forward.”267 
                                                     
257 Id. 
258 Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1(b)(1).      
259Pecuniary, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (5th ed. 2003) (citing Robertson 
Pletke v. White Shobe, 136 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)).  
260 Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1(b)(1). 
261 Info. Res., Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 780, 781 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter 
IRI]. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 784. 
264 Id. The taxpayer’s initial complaint asserted approximately $100,000 in 
damages for lost profits from the failed contract negotiations. Id. at 785. One week 
before the trial the plaintiff attempted to raise a $2.4Mil damages claim for 
impairment to goodwill. Id. Evidence of the impairment to goodwill was excluded 
by the trial court due to the taxpayer’s delay in providing notice of this issue. Id. 
Accordingly, IRI is not persuasive or binding authority as to the goodwill issue. 
However, taxpayers who assert a damages claim concerning goodwill should 
determine how they can prove the goodwill would not have been impaired but for 
the collection violation.    
265 Id. 
266 IRI, supra note 263 at 784-85. 
267 Id. at 784. 
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Similarly, in Music v. United States, the taxpayer filed suit against 
the IRS under section 7433 for levying on her assets prior to giving her 
notice.268  The IRS sent a notice of intent to levy to the wrong last known 
address, followed by service of a wage garnishment to the taxpayer’s 
employer.269  The taxpayer quit her job the day after receiving a garnished 
paycheck.270  The plaintiff alleged that she was forced to quit her job because 
her new net paycheck was insufficient to cover her living expenses, which 
caused her to suffer in excess of $1,000,000 in damages.271  The court held 
the IRS negligently failed to provide advance notice of the levy, and therefore 
was liable under section 7433.272  However, the court determined that the IRS 
violation was not the proximate cause of actual, direct economic damages.273  
The court reasoned that the taxpayer’s damages were the result of the size of 
her tax liability in relation to her income.274  Consequently, even if the 
taxpayer had received proper notice, the taxpayer would have suffered the 
same damages.275 
 
 Information Resources, Inc. and Music reveal the serious challenge 
to recovery under section 7433A.  If a PCA violates a specific collection 
right, such as improperly communicating with a third party, the taxpayer 
must show that the economic loss would not have occurred but for the action 
of the PCA.  As in Information Resources, Inc., it may be hard for a taxpayer 
to prove proximate causation when various circumstances exist that may 
have caused the pecuniary loss.   
 
In light of this challenge, Congress should amend Code section 
7433A to include statutory damages.  If a PCA can harass, abuse, or make 
end runs around the FTCP with little concern about suffering monetary 
penalties, these laws do not serve their intended purpose.  Taxpayers should 
not have to defend against numerous causes to deter PCAs from violating 
taxpayer collection rights.  An amendment to section 7433A should allow 
taxpayers to obtain statutory damages up to $25,000.276   
                                                     
268 Music v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 3d, 1327, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
269 Id. at 1331-32. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 1335. Without accessing the taxpayer’s complaint, it is not entirely clear 
what the basis is for the taxpayer’s calculation of damages.   
272 Id. at 1332. 
273 Music, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 1335. The court also held that even if the taxpayer did 
suffer actual, direct economic damages, the taxpayer failed to mitigate the damages 
by not availing herself of a collection due process hearing, calling the IRS, and 
quitting her job prior to determining why she actually owed $38,000 in taxes. Id. at 
1336. 
274 Id. at 1335-36. 
275 Id. at 1335. 
276 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (2012).  The FDCPA authorizes statutory 
damages up to $1,000.  While this amount is too low, Congress did provide 
consumers with some basis for recovery when they are unable to prove actual 
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To further ensure that PCA conduct does not go unpunished, 
Congress should include an amendment for attorney’s fees.  While recovery 
of the costs of the action is helpful, a failure to include a recovery for 
attorney’s fees leaves taxpayers filing pro se complaints and likely losing 
against experienced defense attorneys.  The amendments benefitting 
taxpayers can be offset by a final amendment to award of attorney’s fees to 
the defendant if the court determines that the case was brought in bad faith.277  
To incorporate the amendments discussed above, the following language 
should be added to the Code: 
 
Section 7433A is amended by adding at the end the 
following new paragraphs: 
 
(c) Additional Damages.  In any action brought under 
subsection (a), upon a finding of liability on the part of the 
defendant, the defendant shall be liable to the plaintiff for 
additional damages as the court may allow, but not 
exceeding $25,000.   
 
(d) Attorney’s Fee.  In the case of any successful action 
under subsection (a), the plaintiff will be entitled to a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. On a 
finding by the court that an action under this section was 
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the 
court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable 
in relation to the work expended and costs. 
 
The incorporation of these amendments into the Code will substantially 
improve taxpayers’ rights and ensure they receive adequate access to the 
legal system to protect themselves from illegal PCA collection activities.  
 
                                                     
damages. There is no reasonable explanation for providing consumers with 
statutory damages and at the same time denying such damages to taxpayers. While 
this article is proposing an amendment to Code section 7433A, Congress should 
also consider an amendment to Code section 7433 to give taxpayers statutory 
damages for IRS violations. The lack of statutory damages may be the central 
reason for a lack of litigation in this area of law.  Taxpayers and their attorneys 
may not see a reason to file suit when recovery is unlikely. The lack of statutory 
damages essentially takes the teeth out of the FTCP and Code section 7602(c). 
277 The FDCPA has a similar provision, which provides defendants with attorney’s 
fees when the case is deemed to have been brought in bad faith. 15 U.S.C. § 
1692k(a)(3) (2012). 
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B. Remedies Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
 
1. Taxpayers May Also Obtain Civil Damage Awards Under       
the FDCPA.278   
 
 In fact, nearly all rights discussed in this article may be asserted 
by utilizing the FDCPA.279  If PCAs illegally (1) communicate with taxpayers 
at an inconvenient time, when represented by an attorney, or after a cease and 
desist request, (2) contact third parties (i.e., when locating the taxpayer or 
without providing notice), (3) harass and abuse taxpayers, or (4) fail to 
validate a debt, section 1692k of the FDCPA would be an appropriate basis 
for recovery. Legal Requirements for Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
Claims. 
 
Taxpayers may bring a claim under the FDCPA by filing a complaint 
in U.S. District Court within one year of the date of the violation.280  Because 
the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, the complaint must only plead facts to 
prove the PCA committed a collection violation.281  The issue of culpability 
is relevant only to the calculation of damages.282  If a PCA’s conduct is 
deemed to be intentional, the taxpayer will receive some recovery.283  
However, if the PCA’s conduct is deemed negligent or reckless, the PCA 
may be able to avoid paying damages.284  FDCPA damages include (1) actual 
damages caused by the PCA, (2) statutory damages not to exceed $1,000, (3) 
costs of the action, and (4) attorney’s fees.285 
 
There are several important variances between the legal 
requirements for FDCPA and FTCP claims.  Taxpayers who file a claim 
under the FDCPA must assert the claim within one year of the action, as 
compared to two years under the FTCP.  Claims for violations of the FTCP 
must allege intent, recklessness, or negligence, while FDCPA claims need 
                                                     
278 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012); I.R.C. § 6306(g) (2015). 
279 I.R.C. § 7433A(b)(3) (2012). Section 7433A states that it is not the exclusive 
remedy. However, certain rights such as restrictions on PCA communications with 
persons authorized to practice before the IRS, do not exist in the FDCPA (with the 
exception of attorneys).  These rights would need to be litigated under section 
7433A.   
280 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (2012).  
281 Pacheco v. Joseph McMahon Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294-295 (D. Conn. 
2010); Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 6 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 
1993).     
282 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012); Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 297-98 (3rd 
Cir. 2006).   
283 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012). 
284 See Id. 
285 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). 
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only plead facts showing a PCA violation.  However, taxpayers filing a 
FDCPA claim should allege PCA intent when possible to contest the bona 
fide error defense.  Damages under the FDCPA are also more generous than 
under the Code.  
 
2. Taxpayer Recoveries for Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act Violations 
 
Taxpayers will likely not file suit against a PCA unless they foresee 
some reasonable recovery.  The calculation of damages under the FDCPA 
and the FTCP are similar in some respects, and quite different in others.  The 
FDCPA, like the FTCP, provides a statutory basis for recovering actual 
damages and the costs of litigation.286  However, the FDCPA provides two 
additional bases for recovery in the form of statutory damages and attorney’s 
fees.287  Statutory damages are capped at $1,000, while attorney’s fees are 
uncapped but must be reasonable in amount.288   
 
The impact of the additional bases for recovery under the FDCPA 
are twofold.  First, taxpayers do not have to prove actual damages to obtain 
statutory damages.289  This may be particularly important to taxpayers who 
believe that they have suffered actual damages, but are unsure as to whether 
proof will be sufficient to persuade the trier of fact.  In the event that 
taxpayers are successful as to the liability issue, they can be assured of some 
recovery by means of statutory damages.290 Second, taxpayers will have more 
success in finding an attorney to litigate a claim arising under the FDCPA 
due to its inclusion of attorney’s fees.  While taxpayers may have the funds 
to pay for a plaintiff’s attorney out of pocket, many taxpayers will not and 
will need the attorney to earn fees by means of a contingency arrangement.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys will not take contingency cases which provide $1,000 
recoveries.  Consequently, the inclusion of attorney’s fees in the FDCPA 
removes a substantial bar to litigation and should enable more taxpayer suits 
against PCAs.  
Although the statutory construction of section 1692k of the FDCPA 
seems very taxpayer friendly, one subsection of this statute significantly 
favors PCAs.  If a PCA can show by a preponderance of the evidence that its 
violation of taxpayer rights was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide 
error, despite having reasonable internal controls, the PCA will escape 
                                                     
286 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (3) (2012). 
287 Id. at § 1692k(a)(2)(A), (3) (2012). 
288 Id. 
289 Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 
2006); Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998); McCammon v. Bibler, 
Newman, & Reynolds, P.A., 493 F. Supp. 2d. 1166, 1171 (D. Kan. 2007) (actual 
damages are not required for standing under the FDCPA). 
290 This statement assumes the defendant is unable to prove the violation was a 
bona fide error. 
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liability.291  The bona fide error defense requires proof of three elements: (1) 
the alleged violation was unintentional (i.e., negligent or reckless), (2) the 
alleged violation resulted from a bona fide error, and (3) the bona fide error 
occurred despite existing procedures designed to avoid such errors.292     
   
  In Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc., the debt collector issued the 
consumer a letter in connection with collection of a debt.293  In response, the 
consumer hired an attorney, who sent a cease and desist letter to the debt 
collector.294  The debt collector received the cease and desist, but a second 
letter was mailed to the consumer one day later.295  The consumer’s complaint 
alleged that the debt collector failed to honor the cease and desist letter, while 
the debt collector asserted that the second letter was merely a bona fide 
error.296  The court determined the mailing of the second letter was a bona 
fide error.  It relied upon affidavits of the defendant’s employees stating the 
mailing was inadvertent and a five-page instruction manual describing the 
defendant’s collection procedures.297   
 
Conversely, in Crafton v. Law Firm of Jonathan B. Levine, the debt 
collector issued a collection letter that misstated the amount of the debt owed 
and failed to include the “in writing” requirement for contesting the validity 
of the debt.298  The debt collector asserted the bona fide error defense only 
with respect to the amount of the debt.299  The debt collector stated that it had 
various procedures in place to prevent errors, such as documenting calls to 
consumers, review of the ledgers enclosed with the collection letters for 
egregious or usurious charges, and ensuring that the ledger was associated 
with the correct consumer.300  The court determined that the debt collector’s 
procedures were not reasonably adapted to prevent inaccurate debt 
amounts.301  The court referenced a need for some type of client agreement 
                                                     
291 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012). 
292 Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 297-98 (3rd Cir. 2006); Johnson v. 
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Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 2005). 
293 Smith v. Transworld Sys. Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1026-27 (6th Cir. 1992). 
294 Id. at 1027. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1031. 
298 Crafton v. Law Firm of Jonathan B. Levine, 957 F. Supp. 2d 992, 995-96 (E.D. 
Wis. 2013). 
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regarding the currency and accuracy of accounts delivered to the debt 
collector.302   
 
Despite the challenges imposed by the bona fide error defense, 
taxpayer recoveries under the FDCPA are more feasible.  Taxpayers will 
have easier access to plaintiffs’ attorneys and they will have confidence that 
they can receive some sort of statutory recovery if they cannot prove actual 
damages.  Nonetheless, Congress should consider an amendment to increase 
the statutory damages available if a case is brought pursuant to Code section 
6306(g).  Taxpayers are a particularly susceptible group of consumers in light 
of the complexity of the tax code.  More protections should exist in light of 
these complexities.  Accordingly, the statutory damages cap should be 
increased from $1,000 to $25,000.   
 
To incorporate the amendment discussed above, the following 
language should be added to the FDCPA: 
 
Section 1692k is amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraph: 
 
(f) Actions Brought Under I.R.C. § 6306(g).  If an action 
is brought under I.R.C. § 6306(g) to enforce liability created 
by this subchapter, paragraph (2)(A) of subsection (a) shall 
be applied by substituting “$25,000” for “$1,000.” 
 
Taxpayers should fully examine the facts and law prior to 
determining the proper basis for filing a claim.  Certain violations must be 
litigated under the Code section 7433A while other violations may be 
litigated under either body of law.  Each body of law has its pros and cons.  
Depending on when the accrual of the claim occurred, Code section 7433A 
may be the only option for taxpayers due to its lengthened statute of 
limitations.  It’s also possible that a claim under the Code may be more 
successful in light of the absence of the bona fide error defense.  However, 
taxpayers may have difficulty in finding a plaintiff’s attorney to litigate a 
7433A claim if no attorneys’ fees are recoverable.  Claims brought under the 
FDCPA have a greater likelihood of being awarded money damages and 
attorneys will be likely take such cases due to the attorney’s fees provision. 
Whatever the basis for litigation, taxpayers should protect their 
rights.  Remedies are available for taxpayers and these recoveries should be 
utilized.  Failure to protect taxpayer rights will result in harmful collection 
practices, which should not be employed when collecting public debts.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Congress’s recent decision to require IRS use of private debt 
collectors is quite significant.  PCAs must be employed to collect inactive 
tax receivables, which can accrue on an annual basis.  As a result, PCAs will 
have an indefinite stream of business.  Taxpayers may not be aware of 
collection rights that exist for tax debts.  A lack of knowledge may easily 
impact the taxpayers’ well-being and the amount of tax that they are required 
to pay.  If collection rights are violated, taxpayers should be aware of judicial 
remedies.  Depending on the level of PCA misconduct, taxpayers may wish 
to initiate litigation.  An analysis of when the claim accrued, the nature of the 
claim, and damages available will assist in making a litigation determination.   
 
Because these recent statutory amendments can significantly affect 
taxpayers’ rights, this article proposes that Congress should amend Code 
section 7433A to provide statutory damages and attorney’s fees, and amend 
the FDCPA to increase statutory damages for cases brought under the Code.  
These changes will bring the Code one step closer to legitimizing Congress’s 
promise to provide taxpayers with a true Bill of Rights.  
 
